About

Leif Wenar is the Olive H. Palmer Professor in Humanities at Stanford University, with courtesy appointments as Professor of Political Science and Professor of Law. He received his AB in Philosophy from Stanford and earned his PhD in Philosophy at Harvard. After working in Britain, he returned to Stanford's Department of Philosophy in September 2020. His research focuses on developing unity theory, a new approach to understanding what makes for more valuable lives, relationships, and societies. Wenar is the author of the book Blood Oil: Tyrants, Violence, and the Rules that Run the World, as well as the author-meets-critics volume Beyond Blood Oil: Philosophy, Policy, and the Future. He has contributed entries on John Rawls and Rights to The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and has published articles in numerous academic journals including Mind, Analysis, Philosophy & Public Affairs, Ethics, The Journal of Political Philosophy, The Columbia Law Review, and The Philosopher’s Annual. Wenar has also co-edited works on economist F. A. Hayek and on philanthropy ethics. His professional experience includes visiting professorships at Stanford’s Center on Ethics and Society, Princeton’s University Center for Human Values, and the Australian National University School of Philosophy, among others. His public writing has been featured in major outlets such as The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Los Angeles Times, and Foreign Affairs. Additionally, he served on the Mayor’s Policing Ethics Panel in London, advising on issues related to digital surveillance and use of force. His work can be found at wenar.info.

Research topics

• Computer Science
• Sociology
• Philosophy
• Epistemology
• Political Science
• Mathematics
• Psychology
• Aesthetics
• Social psychology
• Law
• Environmental ethics

Selected publications

• Looking Beyond the IRB

  The American Journal of Bioethics · 2025-01-29 · 2 citations

  letterOpen access
  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• Frontmatter

  Moral Philosophy and Politics · 2024-04-01

  articleOpen access
  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• Frontmatter

  Moral Philosophy and Politics · 2023-03-27

  articleOpen access
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• A Society of Self-Respect

  Cambridge University Press eBooks · 2023-07-20

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding

  Rawls’s Original Position, the most influential thought experiment in modern political philosophy, cannot be the justification of Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness. The Original Position cannot satisfy Rawls’s own publicity condition, which requires justifications that are accessible to all citizens. I hypothesize that over time Rawls weakened his publicity condition because he saw this tension, but that he could not resolve it. However, Rawls’s work contains a justification for justice as fairness that is publicly accessible: that in a well-ordered society, all citizens can have self-respect. I set up this discussion with Rawls’s critique of meritocracy, which, Rawls fears, sets citizens against each other in a zero-sum competition for self-respect. In a meritocracy, elites display their power and wealth, while the less fortunate may fall into resentment, rancor, and possibly a destructive racial nationalism. A Rawlsian society of self-respect offers a more just and stable model of social unity.

  PublisherDOI

• The Value of Unity

  Philosophy &amp Public Affairs · 2023 · 2 citations

  1st authorCorresponding
  • Sociology
  • Epistemology
  • Social psychology

  Two debates over value are nearly coeval with philosophy itself. One debate is over what is good for its own sake (intrinsically good), the other is over what contributes to an individual's welfare (“what would make this person's life go, for him, as well as possible”).1 These two debates, over “the good” and “the good-for,” are distinct, yet they have been parallel both in their leading theories and their main objections. Historically, the leading theories in both debates have been hedonist, desire-satisfaction, objective list, and perfectionist theories.2 Hedonist theories claim that what is valuable—either intrinsically or for a person—tracks only experiential quality. One challenge for hedonist theories is that malicious or otherwise anti-social pleasures may seem not to be valuable in either sense.3 Another challenge is to distinguish higher and lower pleasures: to explain how some activities are more valuable even if others are enjoyed just as much.4 Hedonist theories also fail to register non-experiential facts that seem evaluatively relevant, such as that a person has false friends.5 Similarly, hedonist theories suggest that the best life can be had by entering Nozick's experience machine, which many find implausible.6 Desire-satisfaction theories are challenged by what Chris Heathwood calls “defective desires.”7 For example, and parallel to hedonism, some people have anti-social desires, such as to see cruelty, or to be cruel. More, and again parallel to hedonism, some people have what might seem trivial or worthless desires, such as to count blades of grass.8 Other people have masochistic or imprudent or adaptive preferences that are self-destructive or self-negating.9 Moreover, some desires incorporate mistaken beliefs, which appear to vitiate the value of their satisfaction.10 Objective list theories lack explanatory power. As David Brink says, a mere list of purportedly valuable states “begins to look like a disorganized heap of goods.”11 Ben Bradley objects more sharply: a view that “does not tell us why those things are on the list or how to weight them… is not theorizing, but a refusal to theorize.”12 There seems little that proponents can say when their lists diverge; for example, Martha Nussbaum lists sexual satisfaction as a central functioning, while G.E. Moore describes sexual pleasure as “evil in itself.”13 And even where lists have elements in common, such as “success” and “love,” they may seem only to be enumerating judgments shared by those making the lists.14 Perfectionist theories attempt to explain the goods on an objective list as activities that develop or exercise characteristic human capacities.15 Yet the development or exercise of some such capacities (like gratuitously inflicting pain) are anti-social.16 Perfectionism also strains to capture the attractive idea that pleasure is good, as feeling pleasure is not a capacity that can be developed or exercised.17 Even more challenging is the idea that pain is bad, as perfectionism seems stronger as an account of value than of disvalue.18 Perfectionism may also violate a resonance constraint, when it classifies as valuable activities that are not “compelling or attractive” to those engaged in them.19 These debates over “the good” and “the good-for” have continued inconclusively for centuries.20 Each theory has well-known strengths, yet apparently incurable defects. I believe that value theory is at this impasse because we have inherited too few theoretical options at the object level. The familiar hedonist, desire-satisfaction, and perfectionist theories are too simplistic to capture many of our confident evaluative judgments, while no objective list theory can justify the elements it includes and excludes. Because these object-level theories are inadequate, metaethical debates that refer to them (e.g., between objective versus subjective theory, or about the relationships between value and reasons) can inherit their weaknesses. This article outlines a new object-level theory of intrinsic value by setting out a formal model that generates lists of ultimate goods and bads.21 This formal model is extensionally more adequate than familiar hedonist, desire-satisfaction, and perfectionist theories, while also being simpler and more fruitful than an objective list.22 Most of the article will be devoted to defining this formal model precisely and to showing that it appears to capture central features of how we reason about value. I will also interpret this model in ways that suggest that the concept that structures our reasoning about value is unity. Ultimately, I will propose that value acts as if all wills are one, meeting the world together.23 I help them fight child abuse. I help them commit child abuse. I stop them committing child abuse, etc. The model to come will show that the logics that explain such complex evaluations have a formalization that is compact and cognitively ergonomic. More, this new approach will overcome many of the challenges to the four traditional theories: explaining the badness of anti-sociality, the distinction between higher and lower pleasures, when to enter the experience machine, and so on. Specific logics of unity appear to structure a core of human evaluative reasoning, or so I will venture. Physical pleasure and acts of kindness are good in themselves, we believe, even when they lead to what is bad. Similarly, physical pain and acts of cruelty are bad in themselves, even if they lead to a greater balance of good. Why is this so? As we return to the ancient question of “the good,” we will need some modesty about what we can achieve. First, the main ambition of this article is only to describe a new object-level theory of intrinsic value. Indeed, as is typical with the four traditional theories, the ambition is even less. The ambition is only to describe an object-level theory of basic intrinsic value, to which any (non-basic) intrinsic values will stand in some valid relation.24 To illustrate, if pleasure is a basic intrinsic value then “maximum pleasure” might be an intrinsic value that stands in a mereological relation to it.25 Or again, Thomas Hurka claims that knowledge is a basic intrinsic value and that “loving knowledge” is an intrinsic value that stands in an intentional relation to it.26 Other such relations have also been proposed.27 “X is intrinsically valuable” occurs often in the literature.28 In this article we only say that for any assertion of intrinsic value to be correct, “X” would need to refer to, or stand in some valid relation to, the basic intrinsic values described here. For the second boundary on this article's scope, our study here is value theory, not moral theory. We will draw no conclusions about what is right and wrong, praiseworthy and blameworthy, or what anyone should do. Third, we also set aside political theory. Though the intrinsic disvalue of certain relations (like domination) will be discussed, there is nothing here about what institutions there should be or how scarce resources should be distributed. Fourth, the value theory here is not an ethical theory—a theory of the good person. An ethical theory will explain what character traits a person should and should not have (the virtues and vices). For example, an ethical theory will detail when a person is being attentive or callous: that is, when a person is being appropriately sensitive to the ends of others. Since the value theory here will not speak to what character traits a person should have, it will not aim to explain attentiveness or callousness.29 The theory here will explain the intrinsic value of actions like helping someone, which an ethical theory might use to explain the virtue of helpfulness. The theory here will also explain the intrinsic value of actions like taking care of someone, which an ethical theory might use to help explain the value of caring about someone that, as Stephen Darwall says, “involves a whole complex of emotions, sensitivities, and dispositions.”30 Yet the value theory here can only hope to inform such an ethical theory, not to complete it. The new theory of intrinsic value will be a species of desire-satisfaction theory. As in all such theories, good and bad will be functions of desire-satisfaction and there will be no desire-independent values. Desire-satisfaction theories of value have a distinguished historical pedigree and remain popular in philosophy and economics.31 Part of their attraction has been that, especially in matters of taste and fancy, getting what one wants often seems to be good. Desire-satisfaction theories also obey the resonance constraint, by classifying as valuable only activities that are compelling to those engaged in them.32 Yet traditional desire-satisfaction theories fail extensionally because they attempt to explain value with only a single formal function: good is just “whatever satisfies (informed, etc.) desires.” This simplistic function leaves traditional desire-satisfaction theory vulnerable to extensional objections, especially concerning anti-social desires. A single function cannot capture the phenomena of value, because the value of a satisfied desire depends on its object—particularly when its object is the satisfaction of another desire. What will distinguish the new desire-satisfaction theory from traditional versions is how it characterizes value as emerging from the logical relations that one's desires can have not only to the world, but also to others' desires and to one's own desires. The formal model to come will set out the logics of desire-satisfaction along three distinct dimensions of value: value in our relations to the world, value in our relations to each other, and value in our relations to ourselves. We might call these the “extrapersonal,” the “interpersonal,” and the “intrapersonal” dimensions of value. In addition to this three-dimensional structure, the formal model will be built with further definitions and axioms, some familiar and some novel. Early on, there will be a distinction between positive and negative desires. The middle of the article will draw out the implications of two axioms: telicism, familiar from Parfit, and telic nesting, which is new. As with any new model, some elements may initially seem surprising; yet, as the bulk of the article shows, the model fits the “data” of our confident evaluations, while remaining relatively simple. Throughout, this new theory of intrinsic value will be purely formal. What is good will turn on formal relations of our desires to the world (Section II), to others' desires (Section III), and to our own desires (Section IV). By the end, these logics of unity will yield an attractive value pluralism. The theory will affirm that many lifestyles and cultural practices are good in themselves, while confirming that bullying and racist domination are intrinsically bad. The formal model will turn on relations that define very specific senses of “unity.” The success of this model naturally raises the question of why these exact relations seem to capture our evaluative reasoning. Toward the end, I respond to this question by sketching an interpretation of the formal model, the “many-one interpretation.” This interpretation explains the structure of the formal model by drawing a parallel between interpersonal value and individual rationality. At the very end, I extend this interpretation by reworking an image from Plato's Symposium. The formal model, and its interpretation, will raise many metaethical questions. For example, like all desire-satisfaction theories, the new theory will need to explain why our phenomenology often seems to favor a “desired because good” explanation within a Euthyphro problem.33 There is also a larger set of questions for all such theories about the relations between value so understood and deontic concepts like “reasons” and “ought.”34 Instead of addressing those questions, I will conclude with the hope that philosophers will welcome having a new approach to intrinsic value to consider. Extrapersonal desires define the first dimension of intrinsic value in the formal model. Extrapersonal desires have the world as their object, for example “that I eat the chocolate,” or “that I go for a row,” or “that the Reef will survive this century.” (Here, “the world” is a technical term in the formal model, comprising any state of affairs that is not the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of a desire.) This extrapersonal dimension of value follows a distinctive logic of unity, which can be described quickly because it resembles traditional (single-function) desire-satisfaction theory. We begin with Derek Parfit's notion of a “telic” desire, which is a desire for some state of affairs as an end, or for its own sake.35 One axiom of unity theory is that the satisfaction of a (positive) telic extrapersonal desire has intrinsic value. Take the example of physical sensations. We define a “pleasing” sensation as one that is the object of a telic desire: a sensation that one wants to have for its own sake. It follows that having a sensation that is the object of such a desire is good. Having pleasing sensations is intrinsically good because one is experiencing bodily sensations that one wants to have for their own sake. Many desires for bodily sensations are ingrained into our common animal nature. Other such desires vary widely across persons. On this account, the value of sensations tracks a person's desires: it is good that you experience the taste of chocolate only if you want to experience the taste of chocolate.36 We will call a satisfied telic extrapersonal desire a “basic unity.” What of the badness of physical pain? Here it is useful to revive a concept of Bernard Williams, of a “negative desire”: a desire that something not occur.37 As a pleasing sensation is one that is the object of a telic positive desire, so an aversive sensation is one that is the object of a telic negative desire. We extend the axioms to say that, just as the satisfaction of a positive extrapersonal desire has intrinsic value, so the dissatisfaction of a negative extrapersonal desire has intrinsic disvalue. In a “basic disunity,” one gets what one wants not to get. Aversive sensations are bodily sensations that, in themselves, one wants not to have. Thus the experience of an aversive sensation (like physical pain) is intrinsically bad.38 The zero point of extrapersonal value is the dissatisfaction of a positive desire (when one does not get what one wants) and the satisfaction of a negative desire (when one does not get what one wants not to get). In these cases, neither a basic unity nor disunity is formed, and (it is axiomatic that) no intrinsic value is present. The satisfaction of a positive telic extrapersonal desire has value, the dissatisfaction of a negative telic extrapersonal desire has disvalue. In contrast to perfectionist theories, the most attractive theses of hedonism, about the intrinsic value of physical pleasure and pain, follow directly from the definitions and axioms so far.39 Extrapersonal desires need not have sensations as their objects: the objects of a person's world-oriented desires can be states of affairs beyond her current or possible experience. One can want to see the cherries blossom next spring, for example, or want that one's book stay in print after one's death. Any such desire may integrate some factually incorrect beliefs, which raises a classic problem: is what satisfies a desire based on false beliefs good or not? Parfit advances a thesis that handles desires based on false beliefs about means. Parfit says that only what satisfies telic desires matters—only what is wanted for its own sake.40 Call this thesis “telicism” for intrinsic value. Say a woman falsely believes that this train will take her to her lover. Then, by telicism, her taking this train will not help to satisfy her telic desire, and will have no value in itself. And yet, as Parfit says, one may also have telic desires with false beliefs incorporated in their end.41 Consider an ancient Canaanite, say, who wants to worship the god Baal. Or consider Arneson's wife, who (Arneson imagines) wants to construct a huge monument to his virtue, which she wildly overestimates.42 Some theorists move from such examples to “informed desire” (or “ideal advisor”) theories, which attempt to filter out desires based on false beliefs.43 Yet we might instead stay within actual desire theory, and look to the teleological nature of desire.44 Desiring entails having a disposition to attend to an end, and to realize (or prevent) it when one believes that one can do so.45 The end of a desire sets its telos: its aim or object. The actions taken by the Canaanite or Arneson's wife cannot achieve the aims of their telic desires, because the definite descriptions within their ends (“the god Baal,” “Arneson's great virtue”) have no referents. So their actions cannot be valuable with respect to these aims, which is the correct result. What of wishing? A wish is a desire whose end the agent believes she cannot act to achieve. When an agent has a wish, her underlying disposition may keep her attention directed at the end, even as her practical reasoning keeps churning out the result that she can take no action to achieve it. When a wished-for state of affairs comes about (“I wish the sun would shine”), a basic unity is created just as when an end is achieved through action. For extrapersonal desires, it is good when one gets what one wants, whether through action or by happenstance.46 How good? Degree of value varies with strength of desire. A stronger desire disposes an agent to attend more to things associated with its end; and a stronger desire motivates the agent more to realize or prevent the end, modulo the agent's subjective probability of attaining the end.47 The pursuit of a weak desire is easily abandoned for other desires, while a life project may be pursued across a wide range of circumstances at cost to other The stronger the desire, the more valuable is the of the This account of extrapersonal value what has many to traditional desire-satisfaction Here value tracks only what one so the account the resonance Moreover, this account that, in many cases, getting what one wants can be very says that what is valuable on what we which can be a even to Yet if we for a and call that is not desire-satisfaction “the we can say that, on this account, value from between will and is good and cruelty is These look to be desire-independent judgments of value. I will suggest that while these judgments are that they purely formal relations desires. There is a if you a the relations that desires can have to each other, and one one it in interpersonal The structures our evaluative and many of our confident judgments of value have formal relations between desires at their desires have the desire-satisfaction of others as their The logics of interpersonal desire are more complex than the logic of extrapersonal desire, because interpersonal desires are all desires, and they have two possible In the of the first structure, the or the object of one person's desire is another person's In the of the second structure, the or two people the end of The what we want to do to and for each the what we want to do with each We will the most of This to set out its the next two the of this to explain evaluative We then turn to with we in more and make some basic between the right and the good, this with a interpretation of the and how it the us on the with a for a certain pleasing sensation like the of the sun on his As we have this that has a telic extrapersonal desire for this his desire is “that I consider the second A who has a telic interpersonal desire: that have the experience that wants to have. The object of telic desire is end is “that wants to When the we say that is in unity with the world and that A is a in unity with The satisfaction of desire generates its own positive value. To the value in a like this one, two are one the and one the A It is good the when the sensation that wants to have of desires us that has value and does not has value it is also good the A when desire that experience this sensation is satisfied On the A has value and does not has value The satisfaction of desire generates a interpersonal to be to the extrapersonal of When the the of value is Say that A wants to an aversive sensation like In this wants “that I not and A wants this negative desire of to be As feeling the aversive sensation is there is extrapersonal disvalue in experiencing sensations that wants not to have. the the dissatisfaction of negative desire has value and the satisfaction of this desire does not has value Yet A as her end the dissatisfaction of desire: will is with the satisfaction of desire has value and its dissatisfaction has value The satisfaction of desire generates its When the aversive the of value is in more of the logical out the formal model. Say that A desires that one of negative extrapersonal desires be A (like wants not to a when desire is the value is and the A value is Say that A desires that one of positive extrapersonal desire be A wants not to experience a when desire is the value is and the A value is This formal model has a For that when A wants a desire of to be the satisfaction of desire generates interpersonal value whether desire is positive or is, whether A wants to or A wants not to pain, the satisfaction of desire is an interpersonal unity Similarly, when A wants a desire of to be the satisfaction of desire has interpersonal disvalue whether desire is positive or A wants not to or A wants to pain, the satisfaction of desire is an interpersonal disunity This is a central of the model, which will be for the interpretation of The so may to an familiar from Hurka and the the good is good, the bad is the may parallel some of the logic of value described it will not be useful in unity theory. not on (like but on desire-satisfaction we might Moreover, the to “the good” can the values at it may not distinguish pleasure” as a good from feeling as a good. As we to set out the formal model, there will be more between unity theory and theories, which will be in the Even in the model that we have so the explanatory of the is For how the the that it can be bad when people get what they this model, for to act is to for its own sake certain desires of another their desires not to The objective badness of cruelty follows from the formal relations between the desires, and the says that the more a person wants to act and the things get. We this result to desires with an desire theory, and that cruelty is bad with an objective list theory. In this model, the objective badness of cruelty is by the formal that the objective value of of of and so on. The model directly when it is bad that people get what they the that when it is good that people get what they This formal model is, like perfectionist theories, a account of the elements on an objective Yet the model is a extensional with our evaluative The model so appears to some of the structure of our reasoning about interpersonal value. Moreover, how the theory is this logic in our evaluative concepts as of kindness and are good in themselves, while and and malicious acts are bad in These judgments of value are being in of formal relations between desires. The more concepts we can account for in this of formal relations between more we will have that this model tracks the underlying structure of our evaluative for is bad. On a formal is bad because of its of cruelty and The as her the the wants to her to experience sensations that cannot help not to The cruelty the A with the pain and other the to an action that is negative to the positive end of the value to take care of someone and his pain, both of which interpersonal and extrapersonal value. us for the of this on where the satisfaction of the desires will positive value (e.g., the will achieve some telic extrapersonal In these cases, many interpersonal value concepts can be as by which an agent the satisfaction of a desires. For example, acts of and help the to achieve his and are good for the and another with what desires, which is in these of these value concepts yield to in of purely formal relations between desires. We can to find “the formal in the with of familiar where an agent in a desires. with Here A a false in in to Say is in to get to and the to A whether is on the right will be bad, as A the badness of is the A be to the of value the of getting in the It is bad in for A gratuitously to The of this says that the badness of the A on not And this is like the badness of other things that A might do to in to For example, A might or or or Here A may be to pain we is as with A may be to of his it is the false with or or or it is the physical In all these cases, telic desire is to not to achieve and success will be bad the A over and the badness of the A of telic In any the agent's will result in the at one of his desires (e.g., his desire for life instead of his desires for life and So when A for its own this

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• Frontmatter

  Moral Philosophy and Politics · 2022

  • Computer Science
  • Computer Science
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• Frontmatter

  Moral Philosophy and Politics · 2022-10-01

  articleOpen access
  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• Frontmatter

  Moral Philosophy and Politics · 2021-10-01

  articleOpen access
  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• Frontmatter

  Moral Philosophy and Politics · 2021-04-01

  articleOpen access
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• Fighting the Resources Curse: The Rights of Citizens over Natural Resources

  Northwestern University journal of international human rights · 2021-07-10

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Frequent coauthors

• Thomas Pogge

  139 shared

• John Broome

  Baidu (China)

  135 shared

• Andrew Williams

  Baidu (China)

  135 shared

• Matt Matravers

  135 shared

• Adam Swift

  Czech Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy

  135 shared

• Susan Neiman

  Czech Academy of Sciences, Institute of Philosophy

  135 shared

• Michael Schefczyk

  Karlsruhe Institute of Technology

  135 shared

• Duncan Ivison

  Walter de Gruyter (Germany)

  135 shared

Education

• B.A., Philosophy

  Stanford University

• Ph.D., Philosophy

  Harvard University

Awards & honors

• William H. Bonsall Visiting Professor in the Stanford Philos…
• Laurance S. Rockefeller Fellow at Princeton’s University Cen…
• Fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral…
• Fellow of the Program on Justice and the World Economy at th…
• Faculty Fellow at the Center for Ethics and Public Affairs a…