All-mail voting in Colorado increases turnout and reduces turnout inequality

Electoral Studies · 2021 · 45 citations

• Political Science
• Demographic economics
• Political Science

Estimating Judicial Ideology

The Journal of Economic Perspectives · 2021 · 79 citations

• Political Science
• Law
• Political Science

We review the substantial literature on estimating judicial ideology, from the US Supreme Court to the lowest state court. As a way to showcase the strengths and drawbacks of various measures, we further analyze trends in judicial polarization within the US federal courts. Our analysis shows substantial gaps in the ideology of judges appointed by Republican Presidents versus those appointed by Democrats. Similar to trends in Congressional polarization, the increasing gap is mostly driven by a rightward movement by judges appointed by Republicans. We conclude by noting important avenues for future research in the study of the ideology of judges.

Why Are There So Many Lawyers in Congress?

Legislative Studies Quarterly · 2020 · 58 citations

• Political Science
• Sociology
• Political Science

Scholars have long sought to explain the overrepresentation of lawyers in Congress. This article draws on a wealth of data to explore the causes and consequences of this representational imbalance. While lawyers enter politics at higher rates, self‐selection at best provides a partial explanation. Conditional on running, lawyers win at twice the rate of candidates from other backgrounds. Contrary to prevailing theories in the literature, voters do not reward candidates with backgrounds in law. Rather, lawyers win because of a sizable competitive advantage in early fundraising, owing in large part to their professional networks. This study has important implications for who runs for office, who wins, and the demographic composition of Congress. It also identifies an underexplored mechanism by which the US system of campaign finance sustains deep representational imbalances.

The Judicial Tug of War: How Lawyers, Politicians, and Ideological Incentives Shape the American Judiciary

2020 · 43 citations

• Political Science
• Political Science
• Law

Why have conservatives decried 'activist judges'? And why have liberals - and America's powerful legal establishment - emphasized qualifications and experience over ideology? This transformative text tackles these questions with a new framework for thinking about the nation's courts, 'the judicial tug of war', which not only explains current political clashes over America's courts, but also powerfully predicts the composition of courts moving forward. As the text demonstrates through novel quantitative analyses, a greater ideological rift between politicians and legal elites leads politicians to adopt measures that put ideology and politics front and center - for example, judicial elections. On the other hand, ideological closeness between politicians and the legal establishment leads legal elites to have significant influence on the selection of judges. Ultimately, the judicial tug of war makes one point clear: for good or bad, politics are critical to how judges are selected and whose interests they ultimately represent.