About

Yuval Salant is the Harold L. Stuart Professor of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University. He holds a PhD in Economic Analysis and Policy from the Stanford Graduate School of Business. His research interests include the foundations of behavioral economics and bounded rationality. Salant has a background in computer science, with a master's and bachelor's degree from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, both summa cum laude. He has been a faculty member at Kellogg since 2009, progressing from assistant to associate professor, and currently serves as a professor. His teaching focuses on microeconomics, competitive strategy, and industrial structure. Salant has received multiple awards for excellence in teaching, including the Sidney J. Levy Award for the 2018/19 and 2023/24 academic years.

Research topics

• Artificial Intelligence
• Computer Science
• Econometrics
• Statistics
• Mathematics
• Economics
• Mathematical economics
• Chemistry

Selected publications

• Counting Theorems for Algebraic Relations

  ArXiv.org · 2026-04-16

  articleOpen accessSenior author

  Let X be a set definable in a sharply o-minimal structure. We consider the problem of counting the number of points where X intersects algebraic varieties V over Q of dimension k < codim X, as a function of T := deg(V) + h(V), where h(V) is the log-height of V. In particular, we conjecture that after removing a suitable "algebraic part", this number grows polynomially in T -- a generalization of Wilkie's conjecture. We show that this full conjecture implies some open problems in algebraic independence theory. We also formulate a weaker conjecture stating that all intersections above are contained in a poly(T) amount of balls of radius e^{-T}. We then consider the case where X (subset of C^n) is a (compact piece of a) trajectory of a polynomial differential equation satisfying a variant of Nesterenko's D-property. Our main theorem is a proof of the weakened conjecture for such curves when k < sqrt(n) - 1.

  PublisherOA PDF

• Counting Theorems for Algebraic Relations

  arXiv (Cornell University) · 2026-04-16

  preprintOpen accessSenior author

  Let X be a set definable in a sharply o-minimal structure. We consider the problem of counting the number of points where X intersects algebraic varieties V over Q of dimension k &lt; codim X, as a function of T := deg(V) + h(V), where h(V) is the log-height of V. In particular, we conjecture that after removing a suitable "algebraic part", this number grows polynomially in T -- a generalization of Wilkie's conjecture. We show that this full conjecture implies some open problems in algebraic independence theory. We also formulate a weaker conjecture stating that all intersections above are contained in a poly(T) amount of balls of radius e^{-T}. We then consider the case where X (subset of C^n) is a (compact piece of a) trajectory of a polynomial differential equation satisfying a variant of Nesterenko's D-property. Our main theorem is a proof of the weakened conjecture for such curves when k &lt; sqrt(n) - 1.

  PublisherDOI

• The Memory Premium

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2025-01-01

  articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding
  PublisherDOI

• The Memory Premium

  National Bureau of Economic Research · 2025-04-01

  reportOpen access1st authorCorresponding

  We explore the role of memory for choice behavior in unfamiliar environments.Using a unique data set, we document that decision makers exhibit a "memory premium."They tend to choose in-memory alternatives over out-of-memory ones, even when the latter are objectively better.Consistent with well-established regularities regarding the inner workings of human memory, the memory premium is associative, subject to interference and repetition effects, and decays over time.Even as decision makers gain familiarity with the environment, the memory premium remains economically large.Our results imply that the ease with which past experiences come to mind plays an important role in shaping choice behavior.

  PublisherDOI

• Complexity and Satisficing: Theory with Evidence from Chess

  The Review of Economic Studies · 2025-05-26 · 1 citations

  article1st authorCorresponding

  Abstract We develop a satisficing model of choice in which the available alternatives differ in their inherent complexity. We assume—and experimentally validate—that complexity leads to errors in the perception of alternatives’ values. The model yields sharp predictions about the effect of complexity on choice probabilities, some of which qualitatively contrast with those of maximization-based choice models. We confirm the predictions of the satisficing model—and thus reject maximization—in a novel data set with information on hundreds of millions of real-world chess moves by highly experienced players. Looking beyond chess, our work offers a blueprint for incorporating complexity at the level of individual objects into models of choice and for detecting satisficing outside of the laboratory.

  PublisherDOI

• The Memory Premium

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2025-01-01

  preprintOpen access1st authorCorresponding
  PublisherDOI

• The Memory Premium

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2025-01-01

  preprintOpen access1st authorCorresponding
  PublisherDOI

• Optimal sample sizes and statistical decision rules

  Theoretical Economics · 2024 · 3 citations

  Senior authorCorresponding
  • Computer Science
  • Computer Science
  • Artificial Intelligence

  A statistical decision rule is a mapping from data to actions induced by statistical inference on the data. We characterize these rules for data that are chosen strategically in persuasion environments. A designer wishes to persuade a decision maker (DM) to take a particular action and decides how many Bernoulli experiments about a parameter of interest the DM can obtain. After obtaining these data and estimating the parameter value, the DM chooses to take the action if the estimated value exceeds some threshold. We establish that as the threshold changes, the resulting statistical decision rules in many environments are either simple majority or reverse unanimity.

  PublisherDOI

• Complexity and Satisficing: Theory with Evidence from Chess

  National Bureau of Economic Research · 2022-04-01 · 7 citations

  reportOpen access1st authorCorresponding

  We develop a model of satisficing with evaluation errors that incorporates complexity at the level of individual alternatives. We test the model predictions in a novel data set with information on hundreds of millions of chess moves by experienced players. Consistent with the theory, complex optimal moves are chosen less frequently than simpler ones. Choice frequencies of suboptimal moves follow the opposite pattern. The former finding distinguishes satisficing from a large class of maximization-based models. We further document that skill and time moderate the adverse effect of complexity, and that they complement each other in doing so. Finally, we provide evidence that suboptimal behavior also hinges on the composition of the choice set but not its size. Our findings help to shed some of the first light on the importance of complexity outside of the laboratory.

  PublisherDOI

• Complexity and Choice

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2021-01-01

  articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding
  PublisherDOI

Frequent coauthors

• Ariel Rubinstein

  New York University

  18 shared

• Hervé Moulin

  National Research University Higher School of Economics

  4 shared

• Paola Manzini

  University of Bristol

  4 shared

• Jörg L. Spenkuch

  Kellogg's (Canada)

  4 shared

• Efe A. Ok

  New York University

  4 shared

• Nicola Persico

  Northwestern University

  4 shared

• Vadim Cherepanov

  Ural State University of Physical Culture

  4 shared

• Eddie Dekel

  4 shared

Awards & honors

• Sidney J. Levy Award for Excellence in Teaching 2023/24
• Sidney J. Levy Award for Excellence in Teaching, 2018/19