About

Ömer Karaduman is an Assistant Professor of Operations, Information, and Technology at Stanford Graduate School of Business. His research focuses on the energy transition, studying how market operations, technologies, and policy interact to shape the shift toward a sustainable and decarbonized economy. He earned his PhD in Economics from MIT and his BS in Economics from Bilkent University. His work includes analyzing optimal batching and pricing for power grid interconnection queues, demand response mechanisms, and the behavior of generative agents in energy operations. Additionally, his research explores the economics of grid-scale energy storage, the impact of large-scale wind power investments on wholesale electricity markets, and various issues related to energy market efficiency and infrastructure maintenance.

Research topics

• Business
• Computer science
• Operations management
• Knowledge management
• Medicine

Selected publications

• Economics of Grid-Scale Energy Storage

  Energy, COVID, and Climate Change,1st IAEE Online Conference,June 7-9, 2021 · 2021-06-07 · 13 citations

  article1st authorCorresponding
  Publisher

• Market Failure in Kidney Exchange

  American Economic Review · 2019-10-29 · 62 citations

  articleOpen accessSenior author

  We show that kidney exchange markets suffer from market failures whose remedy could increase transplants by 30 to 63 percent. First, we document that the market is fragmented and inefficient; most transplants are arranged by hospitals instead of national platforms. Second, we propose a model to show two sources of inefficiency: hospitals only partly internalize their patients’ benefits from exchange, and current platforms suboptimally reward hospitals for submitting patients and donors. Third, we calibrate a production function and show that individual hospitals operate below efficient scale. Eliminating this inefficiency requires either a mandate or a combination of new mechanisms and reimbursement reforms. (JEL D24, D47, I11)

  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• Replication data for: What Matters for the Productivity of Kidney Exchange?

  ICPSR Data Holdings · 2018-01-01

  datasetOpen accessSenior author

  Kidney exchange platforms serve patients who need a kidney transplant and who have a willing, but incompatible, donor. These platforms match patients and donors to produce transplants. This paper documents operational details of the three largest platforms in the United States. It then uses the framework developed in Agarwal et al. (2017) to examine how practical details influence platform productivity. The results show that reducing frictions in accepting proposed matches, frequent matching, and encouraging altruistic donors are important ways in which a platform can increase its productivity.

  PublisherDOI

• Market Failure in Kidney Exchange

  National Bureau of Economic Research · 2018-06-01

  articleOpen accessSenior author

  We show that kidney exchange markets suffer from market failures whose remedy could increase transplants by 30%-63%. First, we document that the market is fragmented and inefficient: most transplants are arranged by hospitals instead of national platforms. Second, we propose a model to show two sources of inefficiency: hospitals only partly internalize their patients' benefits from exchange, and current platforms suboptimally reward hospitals for submitting patients and donors. Third, we calibrate a production function and show that individual hospitals operate below efficient scale. Eliminating this inefficiency requires either a mandate or a combination of new mechanisms and reimbursement reforms.

  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• What Matters for the Productivity of Kidney Exchange?

  AEA Papers and Proceedings · 2018-05-01 · 12 citations

  articleOpen accessSenior author

  Kidney exchange platforms serve patients who need a kidney transplant and who have a willing, but incompatible, donor. These platforms match patients and donors to produce transplants. This paper documents operational details of the three largest platforms in the United States. It then uses the framework developed in Agarwal et al. (2017) to examine how practical details influence platform productivity. The results show that reducing frictions in accepting proposed matches, frequent matching, and encouraging altruistic donors are important ways in which a platform can increase its productivity.

  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• Kapak seviyesi altında pulmoner darlık, sağ ventrikül hipertrofisi ve foramen ovale açıklığı

  2011-10-01

  article
  Publisher

Frequent coauthors

• Eduardo M. Azevedo

  University of Pennsylvania

  39 shared

• Clayton R. Featherstone

  Baylor University

  39 shared

• Itai Ashlagi

  Stanford University

  23 shared

• Nikhil Agarwal

  20 shared

• Nikhil Agarwal

  19 shared

• Orhan Doğdu

  Elazığ Eğitim ve Araştırma Hastanesi

  2 shared

• Mikail Yarlıoğlueş

  2 shared

• Oğuzhan Baran

  2 shared

Labs

• Stanford Graduate School of BusinessPI