Alan Crane
· Associate Professor of Finance,Advisor to the Dean on Curriculum InnovationVerifiedRice University · Accounting
Active 2009–2026
About
Alan Crane is an Associate Professor of Finance at Rice University. He holds degrees in economics, finance, and accounting, and earned his PhD from the University of Texas at Austin. His research focuses on the interaction between institutional investors and corporations, with particular emphasis on how these investors influence corporate financial policies and performance evaluation. Crane has published in top finance journals such as the Journal of Finance, Review of Financial Studies, Journal of Financial Economics, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, and Management Science. His work has been presented at major universities and conferences both in the U.S. and internationally, and has been featured in the popular press including CNBC and Bloomberg. In addition to his research, Crane teaches courses on corporate finance, corporate investment policy, and project valuation. He has received multiple teaching awards at Rice and the University of Texas. Prior to his academic career, he worked in consulting, specializing in risk management for energy trading organizations and valuation of midstream energy assets.
Research topics
- Computer Science
- Business
- Economics
- Engineering
- Econometrics
- Advertising
- Actuarial science
- Finance
- Process management
- Internet privacy
- Operations management
Selected publications
Hurdle rate buffers and bargaining power in asset acquisition
Journal of Financial Economics · 2026-02-03 · 1 citations
articleNepo Credit: The Effect of Borrowed Credit Histories
SSRN Electronic Journal · 2026-01-01
preprintOpen accessShould the Public be Concerned about Congressional Stock Trading?
SSRN Electronic Journal · 2025-01-01
preprintOpen accessThe Impact of Regulation on Firm Value: Evidence from Political Connections
The Review of Corporate Finance Studies · 2025-07-30 · 2 citations
articleOpen access1st authorCorrespondingAbstract We examine the relationship between regulatory intensity and firm value. We find that firms facing high regulatory intensity exhibit lower valuations. However, it is the reverse for politically connected firms. Firms with political ties and high regulatory exposure have higher valuation ratios, and their market values increase following new regulations. Additionally, these firms have higher markups and face lower entrance rates by new establishments, consistent with weakened competition. Nonetheless, not all results are robust to the choice of specification. Overall, our findings provide some support for a regulatory capture perspective, suggesting that regulation may enhance value for politically connected firms.
Project Development with Delegated Bargaining: The Role of Elevated Hurdle Rates
National Bureau of Economic Research · 2024-03-01 · 2 citations
reportOpen accessDuring project development, costs are endogenously determined through delegated bargaining with counterparties.In surveys, nearly 80% of CFOs report using an elevated hurdle rate, the implications of which we explore in a delegated bargaining model.We show that elevated hurdle rates can convey a bargaining advantage that exceeds the opportunity cost of forgone projects, whether hurdle rate buffers arise for strategic or non-strategic reasons.Using CFO survey data, we find buffer use is negatively related to the cost of capital and ex ante bargaining power, consistent with the model, and that realized returns exhibit "beat the hurdle rate benchmark" behavior.
Project Development with Delegated Bargaining: The Role of Elevated Hurdle Rates
SSRN Electronic Journal · 2024-01-01
articleOpen accessReal Effects of Markets on Politics: Evidence from US Presidential Elections
American Economic Review Insights · 2024-02-28 · 6 citations
article1st authorCorrespondingDespite the economic importance of the US stock market, there is strikingly little evidence of its impact on elections. Using county-level variation in stock market participation, we document the impact of market returns on election outcomes. High-participation counties are more likely to vote for the incumbent party when the market has performed well relative to low-participation counties. Our findings provide evidence of a novel channel through which stock market fluctuations could be transmitted into the real economy. (JEL D72, G12, G35, G41, G51)
How Prevalent is Informed Trade by Corporate Insiders?
SSRN Electronic Journal · 2023-01-01
articleOpen accessProject Development with Delegated Bargaining: The Role of Elevated Hurdle Rates
SSRN Electronic Journal · 2023 · 10 citations
- Business
- Operations management
- Process management
Hedge Funds and Public Information Acquisition
Management Science · 2022 · 62 citations
1st authorCorresponding- Computer Science
- Business
- Finance
Hedge funds actively acquire publicly available financial disclosures. Funds acquiring such information subsequently earn 1.5% higher annualized abnormal returns than nonacquirers. Trades by the same fund in the same quarter are more profitable when accompanied by public information acquisition. Acquiring public filings is relatively less profitable when macrouncertainty is high. Funds employ a wide range of strategies for acquiring public filings. Those that systematically scrape large volumes of information, specialize in certain filing types, acquire filings with more content changes, or access information immediately outperform other funds. This paper was accepted by Lukas Schmid, finance. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4466 .
Frequent coauthors
- 37 shared
Kevin Crotty
Jones College
- 14 shared
James Weston
Rice University
- 14 shared
Andrew Koch
University of Pittsburgh
- 9 shared
Alexander W. Butler
- 9 shared
Sébastien Michenaud
DePaul University
- 8 shared
Patrick Blonien
Jones College
- 8 shared
Bruce Carlin
- 5 shared
Tarik Umar
Rice University
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