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Alexandre Debs

Alexandre Debs

· Associate Professor of Political ScienceVerified

Yale University · Jackson School of Global Affairs

Active 2001–2025

h-index11
Citations1.1k
Papers5313 last 5y
Funding
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Research signals

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Research topics

  • Computer Science
  • Political Science
  • Computer Security
  • Thermodynamics
  • Microeconomics
  • Psychology
  • Positive economics
  • Mathematics
  • Physics
  • Social psychology
  • Geography
  • Law and economics
  • Management
  • Engineering
  • Keynesian economics
  • Political economy
  • Business
  • Meteorology
  • Mechanical engineering
  • Economics

Selected publications

  • On Nuclear Superiority and National Security

    Journal of Conflict Resolution · 2025-05-02 · 1 citations

    article1st authorCorresponding

    Does nuclear superiority improve national security? The Theory of the Nuclear Revolution (TNR) argues that it does not, but only after assuming that the nuclear balance is irrelevant militarily. Critics argue that it does, pointing at U.S. efforts to achieve nuclear superiority in the Cold War, when the nuclear stalemate was less stable than previously thought. Yet Washington could have been misguided. I offer a game-theoretic model where the nuclear balance matters militarily, perhaps allowing an escape from the nuclear stalemate, and show that greater nuclear capabilities unambiguously improve security under narrow circumstances. If they improve first-strike advantages or if the nuclear stalemate is fragile, they may improve peaceful terms, but only by raising the risk of disaster. I discuss the implications of this argument for our understanding of the U.S. nuclear policy in the Cold War.

  • Radiographic evaluation of ulnar deformity in patients with hereditary multiple osteochondroma and its relationship with radial head dislocation

    Orthopaedics & Traumatology Surgery & Research · 2023-03-09 · 2 citations

    article
  • In Memoriam: Bruce Russett

    International Organization · 2023-01-01

    articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding

    He was one of the most impactful political scientists of his generation, having shaped the field of International Relations by infusing it with a quest for data-driven analysis and fact-based policy design.He was most widely known for his probing analysis of the "democratic peace" -the idea that democracies rarely if ever fight wars against each other.His career spanned many decades and covered several topics beyond the democratic peace, from deterrence theory, to reform of the United Nations Security Council, to determinants of military spending, and the social impacts of civil war.In International Organization alone, he published nine papers between 1971 and 2012.Bruce was also a major public goods provider, editing the Journal of Conflict Resolution between 1973 and 2009.Bruce's most important contributions centered on the democratic peace.The idea itself can be traced back to Immanuel Kant's writings in the late eighteenth century and it began to attract renewed attention from a few scholars in the 1970s and 1980s.Though seemingly simple, the idea was difficult to prove.Bruce used quantitative methods to probe the democratic peace and to evaluate the causal process underlying it.This line of work produced two books, Grasping the Democratic Peace (1993) and

  • Évaluation radiographique de la déformation ulnaire chez les patients atteints de maladie des exostoses multiples, et sa relation avec la luxation de la tête radiale

    Revue de Chirurgie Orthopédique et Traumatologique · 2023-03-29

    article
  • INO volume 77 issue 3 Cover and Front matter

    International Organization · 2023

    • Computer Science
    • Computer Science
    • Business

    An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

  • Utilisation de la déformation ulnaire comme facteur prédictif de luxation de la tête radiale dans la maladie des exostoses multiples de l’enfant

    Hand surgery & rehabilitation · 2021-11-18

    article
  • Testing for a Structural Break in the Volatility of Real GDP Growth in Canada

    RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · 2021-03-18 · 21 citations

    preprintOpen access1st authorCorresponding

    This study tests for a structural break in the volatility of real GDP growth in Canada following the methodology of McConnell and Quiros (1998). A break is found in the first quarter of 1991. Based on disaggregated data, the tests indicate a break in the volatility of the rate of change of investment in residential structures and a break in the volatility of the rate of growth of personal expenditures on goods. Three possible explanations are given for the break in the data: a more service-oriented economy, improved inventory management, and a change in monetary policy.

  • Mutual Optimism and War, and the Strategic Tensions of the July Crisis

    American Journal of Political Science · 2020 · 22 citations

    1st authorCorresponding
    • Political Science
    • Computer Security
    • Political economy

    Abstract Is mutual optimism a rationalist explanation for war? Countries are mutually optimistic if they have incompatible beliefs about the balance of power. Private information may fuel such beliefs, but it is unclear how rational countries could maintain incompatible beliefs if favorable information motivates a decision to fight, once countries incorporate their understanding of equilibrium strategies and later observe their enemy's decision to fight. I show that if countries have multiple reasons to fight—a favorable signal about the balance of power and a high resolve for the issue in dispute—then rational enemies can hold incompatible beliefs about the balance of power because an enemy's preference for war may not come from a favorable signal. Rational countries may even celebrate such an announcement, if it helps justify their own decision to fight. I discuss the implications of this argument for the causes of the First World War.

  • Atomic Assurance: The Alliance Politics of Nuclear Proliferation. By Alexander Lanoszka. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018. 216p. $49.95 cloth.

    Perspectives on Politics · 2019-08-21

    article1st authorCorresponding

    An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.

  • An Economic Theory of War

    The Journal of Politics · 2019-08-16 · 18 citations

    articleSenior author

    When does war occur for economic reasons? In an anarchic environment, stronger states may fear that their security will be undermined by the economic growth of weaker states and may attempt to constrain it. Weaker states, even if they are rising, may prefer to declare war. The weaker institutional constraints on stronger states are, and the smaller the spheres of influence of weaker states are, the greater are the risks of war. We illustrate our theory by analyzing the economic roots of the Second World War, and we reflect on the general lessons of our argument.

Frequent coauthors

  • James D. Fearon

    Stanford University

    20 shared
  • Layna Mosley

    The Ohio State University

    20 shared
  • Nuno P. Monteiro

    Yale University

    20 shared
  • J. Lawrence Broz

    Cambridge University Press

    20 shared
  • Martha Finnemore

    20 shared
  • Rebecca Adler‐Nissen

    University of Copenhagen

    20 shared
  • B. G. Peter

    University of Arkansas at Fayetteville

    20 shared
  • Joel W. Simmons

    20 shared

Education

  • Ph. D., Economics

    Massachusetts Institute of Technology

    2007
  • M. Phil. in Economic and Social History

    University of Oxford

    2002
  • B.Sc. in Economics and Mathematics

    Universite de Montreal

    2000
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