Reassessing Corporate Philanthropy from a Tax Perspective

Florida Tax Review · 2025-03-25

U.S. corporations make and deduct charitable contributions in excess of $20 billion annually. This Article reassesses corporate philanthropy from a tax perspective, asking first whether the federal tax subsidy for corporate philanthropy is greater than the subsidy for the alternative stakeholder philanthropy, as some commentators have previously found. The answer: it depends. The relative degree of subsidy depends on corporate and individual tax rates, obviously, but also on the incidence of corporate philanthropy, i.e., who bears the cost, which is generally unclear, as well as other details, such as whether individual stakeholders itemize deductions. At current tax rates, however, any outsized subsidies for corporate philanthropy result to a large degree from the constriction in itemizing that followed from the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act). And many would view the effective restoration of individual deductions for charitable contributions as a positive feature of corporate philanthropy rather than as a bug. Moreover, from a policy perspective, corporate philanthropy provides numerous advantages over individual philanthropy that have not been discussed or emphasized in the literature. Corporate philanthropy mitigates the inequitable “upside-down” effect of the individual deduction for philanthropy that disproportionately favors charities supported by high-income taxpayers and may mitigate the windfall arising from stakeholder contributions of appreciated securities. Corporate philanthropy also is highly responsive to tax incentives, often provides utility to multiple stakeholders, and even transfers a portion of the cost of U.S. philanthropy to non-U.S. stakeholders. There is, in short, much to like about corporate philanthropy from a tax (and non-tax) policy perspective.

The Sec's Compensation Clawback Loophole

SSRN Electronic Journal · 2022-01-01 · 1 citations

Donor-Advised Funds in the Wake of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act

SSRN Electronic Journal · 2022-01-01 · 1 citations

Executive Pay Clawbacks and Their Taxation

Florida Tax Review · 2021-11-03

Executive pay clawback provisions require executives to repay previously received compensation under certain circumstances, such as a downward adjustment to the financial results upon which their incentive pay was predicated. The use of these provisions is on the rise, and the SEC is expected to soon finalize rules implementing a mandatory, no-fault clawback requirement enacted as part of the Dodd-Frank legislation. The tax issue raised by clawbacks is this: should executives be allowed to recover taxes previously paid on compensation that is returned to the company as a result of a clawback provision? This Article argues that a full tax offset regime is most in keeping with the evolving rationales for clawbacks, with consistent treatment of executives subject to clawbacks, with encouraging even-handed implementation of clawbacks, and with minimizing clawback-induced distortions and other unintended consequences associated with a tax regime that would not provide full offsets. But the tax treatment of clawback payments has been uncertain, and the enactment of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act adds to that uncertainty. Meanwhile, adoption of legislation to ensure that executives are fully compensated for taxes previously paid on recouped compensation is probably a political non-starter. Given that, this Article argues that the IRS and courts should interpret the relevant tax laws liberally to maximize recovery of taxes paid on clawed back compensation.

Tax Complexity and Technology

SSRN Electronic Journal · 2020-01-01 · 1 citations

Employer Losses and Deferred Compensation

eYLS (Yale Law School) · 2019-01-01

Most large public companies offer their executives the opportunity to defer the receipt and taxation of their salary or other current compensation until retirement or some other future date, and equity compensation, which also entails deferral of pay and taxation, constitutes a large fraction of the typical executive pay package. Conventional wisdom holds that employer net operating losses (NOLs) improve the joint economics of deferred and equity compensation (henceforth together "deferred compensation") for the parties. However, empirical studies provide little evidence of an association between employer NOLs and deferred compensation use. This paper focuses on two potential explanations for this apparent disconnect. First, this paper shows that the relationship between employer NOLs and the attractiveness of deferred compensation is more complex and less predictable than is generally recognized, that a large NOL position does not necessarily produce a larger driving force for use of deferred compensation, and that in some cases employer NOLs can actually result in poorer deferred compensation economics. As a result, some employers and executives may rationally choose to ignore employer NOLs when making compensation decisions. Second, even if companies are sensitive to the existence of employer NOLs when making compensation decisions, it is not clear that research methods currently in use would detect the sensitivity. The commonly used proxies and simulations of employer effective marginal tax rates that have been employed in these studies may not adequately capture the complexity of the relationship between NOLs and the economics of deferred compensation.

Taking charge of IT

Company Director · 2019-03-01

It can be an elephant in the room for boards that members lack the knowledge to properly govern the information technology functions in their organisations. Here's how to change that, in six steps.

Common Ownership and Executive Incentives: The Implausibility of Compensation as an Anticompetitive Mechanism

eYLS (Yale Law School) · 2019-01-01

Mutual funds, pension funds and other institutional investors are a growing presence in U.S. equity markets, and these investors frequently hold large stakes in shares of competing companies. Because these common owners might prefer to maximize the values of their portfolios of companies, rather than the value of individual companies in isolation, this new reality has lead to a concern that companies in concentrated industries with high degrees of common ownership might compete less vigorously with each other than they otherwise would. But what mechanism would link common ownership with reduced competition? Some commentators argue that one of the most plausible mechanisms is executive pay design. The idea is that executive pay at companies in concentrated industries with high common ownership may be designed to dampen the incentives of the companies’ managers to compete aggressively with peer firms. This essay challenges both the theoretical and empirical bases for this argument and contends that executive pay design is actually an implausible mechanism linking common ownership with reduced competition. For example, I show that, contrary to the claims of some commentators, the use of competition-enhancing executive relative performance evaluation as a compensation tool has increased dramatically in parallel with the increase in common ownership, exactly the opposite of what one would expect if common owners sought to dampen competition through pay design. Despite voicing skepticism regarding a possible association between common ownership and executive pay design, this essay also offers suggestions for improving empirical analyses going forward that should help to resolve the debate. If, however, as this essay argues, executive pay design is an implausible mechanism, this determination tends to undermine the broader claim that common ownership dampens inter-firm competition.

Common Ownership and Executive Incentives: The Implausibility of Compensation As an Anticompetitive Mechanism

SSRN Electronic Journal · 2019-01-01 · 7 citations

Employer Losses and Deferred Compensation

SSRN Electronic Journal · 2019-01-01