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David Barner

David Barner

· Professor

University of California, San Diego · Psychology

Active 1997–2026

h-index46
Citations6.1k
Papers27948 last 5y
Funding$2.7M
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About

David Barner is a professor in the Department of Psychology at UC San Diego. His research interests focus on language, thought, and conceptual development, with particular attention to case studies involving number, time, space, and logical reasoning. He employs a cross-cultural approach in his studies, conducting research in diverse regions including India, Japan, Latin America, China, and Eastern Europe. His work aims to understand how these fundamental cognitive domains develop and vary across different cultural contexts, contributing to the broader understanding of human cognition and language development.

Research topics

  • Computer Science
  • Psychology
  • Political Science
  • Natural Language Processing
  • Artificial Intelligence
  • Mathematics
  • Social psychology
  • Cognitive psychology
  • Linguistics
  • Statistics
  • Mathematics education
  • Developmental psychology

Selected publications

  • Title Pending

    Glossa a journal of general linguistics · 2026-01-01

    articleOpen accessSenior author
  • ManyNumbers 3: A Multi‐Lab Study of Demographic Correlates of Early Number Knowledge

    Developmental Science · 2026-04-20

    article

    Large scale studies have documented socioeconomic (SES) and racial/ethnic disparities in children's standardized math achievement at kindergarten entry. These early math skills predict future mathematics achievement and career success. However, limited research has been conducted using large sample sizes to understand how SES and race/ethnicity are related to children's numerical skills at even younger ages. The current study aims to investigate sociodemographic variability in three fundamental areas of early numeracy: nonverbal numerosity discrimination, rote counting, and cardinal number word knowledge. In addition, we will examine if the relations between numerical skills might be explained by their shared correlations to sociodemographic factors and if differences in numerical skills between sociodemographic groups can be explained by variability in working memory. Finally, we also investigate whether childcare attendance moderates early sociodemographic differences in numerical abilities. To achieve these goals, data from children aged 2; 6-6; 0 will be gathered from ∼ 45 US sites, drawn from a larger multi-lab international project (ManyNumbers project). The findings of this research will enhance our understanding of early emerging variability in numerical skills and provide insights into developing responsive and inclusive educational practices that support diverse learning needs in the early years. SUMMARY: Early mathematical skills are crucial for long-term academic and career achievement. SES and race/ethnicity-related disparities in math achievement emerge as early as preschool. Most studies use standardized math assessments that combine different numerical skills to assess achievement gaps, leaving uncertain which specific skills vary with demographic variables. We explore disparities in developmentally significant numerical skills and their relation to demographic variables. We also report relations between WM, childcare attendance and numerical skills. Data from approximately N = 1080 children aged 2;6-6;0 will be collected from ∼ 45 US labs, including demographic information and numeracy measures.

  • Training “Zero” in Preschoolers: Fast Referential Learning, Slow Relational Integration

    2026-03-14

    articleSenior author

    Children’s understanding of the number word “zero” typically lags behind positive numbers. According to stage theories, they first interpret “zero” as “nothing” and only later acquire its cardinal meaning and relation to other numbers. This protracted sequence may reflect either limited exposure or the unique conceptual difficulties posed by “zero.” The present study examined (1) if a brief training that matched an empty plate repeatedly with the number word “zero” was enough for children (referred to as “zero-non-knowers”) to acquire both the “nothing” and the cardinal meaning of “zero”; (2) whether a second training session associating “zero” to a null quantity of a specific kind (e.g., a plate that contains “three apples” but “zero bananas”) supported the learning of its cardinal meaning; and (3) whether learning either of these two meanings supports the ability to make numerical comparisons (e.g., that “two” is “more” than “zero”). We found that children aged 3 to 5 years (M = 3.89, SD = 0.58) required fewer than 10 trials to map “zero” to an empty plate in the first training session, but that they required additional trials to associate “zero” to a null quantity of a specific kind in the second training phase, suggesting that many children in the first phase associated “zero” with nothing, rather than with zero items of a specific kind. However, although children quickly learned the referential meanings of “zero,” this training had no impact on their ability to compare it to other numbers, suggesting that this ability develops separately, compatible with stage theory accounts. Thus, although limited exposure to “zero” may be one important factor explaining its delayed acquisition, integrating it into the ordered set of number words may involve additional conceptual change.

  • Cross-Linguistic Factors in Early Numerical Development

    2026-05-19

    articleOpen accessSenior author

    What role does language play in exact numerical reasoning? We argue that natural language represents number at multiple levels that vary cross-linguistically – in grammatical morpho-syntax, in number words, and in rule-governed counting routines. In this chapter, we first describe how cross-linguistic variability in grammatical structure impacts our representations of countable individuals and sets (Part I). Next, we review variability in how languages represent small numbers (Part II). And finally, we describe cross-linguistic variability in the syntactic structure of counting systems (Part III). We suggest that cross-linguistic research provides an important window into how humans come to reason about exact magnitudes, and conclude with a discussion of outstanding questions and avenues for future research.

  • The role of analogy in the linguistic encoding of number and space.

    2026-04-19

    articleOpen accessSenior author

    Adjectives like ‘high’ and ‘low’ or ‘big’ and ‘small’ are often used to describe objects occupying space, but can also be used to describe other domains, like time and number (e.g. ‘the number of crimes was low this year’). The tendency for magnitude words to encode multiple distinct domains of experience raises the question of how they are learned, and whether children initially begin with narrow meanings restricted to the labeled domain or broad meanings which span multiple domains. In the present study, we asked 2- to 5-year-old children to associate a novel adjective (e.g., ‘blicket’) with either spatial or numerical magnitude, and then to extend the novel word to another domain. We found that children more easily applied the word to the labeled domain than the unlabeled domain, and that older children were more likely to extend the word between domains. These results suggest that children may begin with narrow meanings restricted to the labeled domain before analogically extending them between domains, and that general improvements in analogical reasoning in the preschool years may lead children to more readily spontaneously extend words between domains.

  • Training “Zero” in Preschoolers: Fast Referential Learning, Slow Relational Integration

    PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) · 2026-03-13

    preprintSenior author

    Children’s understanding of the number word “zero” typically lags behind positive numbers. According to stage theories, they first interpret “zero” as “nothing” and only later acquire its cardinal meaning and relation to other numbers. This protracted sequence may reflect either limited exposure or the unique conceptual difficulties posed by “zero.” The present study examined (1) if a brief training that matched an empty plate repeatedly with the number word “zero” was enough for children (referred to as “zero-non-knowers”) to acquire both the “nothing” and the cardinal meaning of “zero”; (2) whether a second training session associating “zero” to a null quantity of a specific kind (e.g., a plate that contains “three apples” but “zero bananas”) supported the learning of its cardinal meaning; and (3) whether learning either of these two meanings supports the ability to make numerical comparisons (e.g., that “two” is “more” than “zero”). We found that children aged 3 to 5 years (M = 3.89, SD = 0.58) required fewer than 10 trials to map “zero” to an empty plate in the first training session, but that they required additional trials to associate “zero” to a null quantity of a specific kind in the second training phase, suggesting that many children in the first phase associated “zero” with nothing, rather than with zero items of a specific kind. However, although children quickly learned the referential meanings of “zero,” this training had no impact on their ability to compare it to other numbers, suggesting that this ability develops separately, compatible with stage theory accounts. Thus, although limited exposure to “zero” may be one important factor explaining its delayed acquisition, integrating it into the ordered set of number words may involve additional conceptual change.

  • Object-mass nouns specify individuation lexically: Evidence from English and French

    PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) · 2026-04-28

    preprintOpen access1st authorCorresponding

    In many languages, count nouns trigger a comparison by number (e.g., too many strings), while mass nouns typically do not (e.g., too much string). However, object-mass nouns like furniture exhibit mass syntax but often support a comparison by number (e.g., too much furniture → too many items; Barner & Snedeker, 2005). Some theories argue that object-mass nouns lexically specify individuation, making them semantically like count nouns in that they induce a comparison by number (Bale & Barner, 2009), while others propose that only count nouns force numerical comparisons, leaving object-mass nouns open to contextual shifts (Rothstein, 2017; McCawley, 1975). We evaluated these hypotheses by comparing English quantity judgments for object-mass nouns to (1) collective count nouns, and (2) French judgments for translations of object-mass nouns. In each case, we found that object-mass nouns behaved like count nouns, and were no more susceptible to contextual effects. These findings support the view that object-mass nouns and count nouns specify individuation to the same extent.

  • Training “Zero” in preschoolers: Fast referential learning, slow relational integration

    Cognition · 2026-03-17

    articleSenior author
  • The role of pragmatic context in children’s quantification of parts and wholes

    PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) · 2026-03-25

    preprintOpen access

    Why do children sometimes include the pieces of broken things when asked to count (e.g., “Count the forks”)? In five experiments, we test two ideas: (1) that adults, but not children, exclude parts from counts by reasoning that speakers must only be interested in whole objects with functions that fulfill desired goals, and (2) that only adults exclude parts on the basis of a Gricean inference, on which it is assumed that if a speaker wanted parts to be counted, they would say so. In Experiments 1-3, we find that although children and adults are somewhat less likely to count pieces of objects when speaker goals are explicitly mentioned, large developmental differences remain unexplained. In Experiments 4-5, we provide evidence that children differ most from adults when pieces are presented in the presence of complementary parts (with which they together would form a whole), and that these pieces are significantly more likely to be conceptualized and labeled as “parts”, especially by adults. Together, these findings suggest that adults – but not children – are more likely to exclude broken parts from their counts in response to requests like “Count the forks!” when they are also able to understand that more informative requests could have been made (e.g., “Count the pieces of fork!”).

  • The role of pragmatic context in children’s quantification of parts and wholes

    2026-03-25

    articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding

    Why do children sometimes include the pieces of broken things when asked to count (e.g., “Count the forks”)? In five experiments, we test two ideas: (1) that adults, but not children, exclude parts from counts by reasoning that speakers must only be interested in whole objects with functions that fulfill desired goals, and (2) that only adults exclude parts on the basis of a Gricean inference, on which it is assumed that if a speaker wanted parts to be counted, they would say so. In Experiments 1-3, we find that although children and adults are somewhat less likely to count pieces of objects when speaker goals are explicitly mentioned, large developmental differences remain unexplained. In Experiments 4-5, we provide evidence that children differ most from adults when pieces are presented in the presence of complementary parts (with which they together would form a whole), and that these pieces are significantly more likely to be conceptualized and labeled as “parts”, especially by adults. Together, these findings suggest that adults – but not children – are more likely to exclude broken parts from their counts in response to requests like “Count the forks!” when they are also able to understand that more informative requests could have been made (e.g., “Count the pieces of fork!”).

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