About

Martin Lariviere is the John L. and Helen Kellogg Professor of Operations at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, a position he has held since 2011. He joined the Kellogg faculty in 2000 and has also served as the Director of the Center for Operations and Supply Chain Management since 2004. His research focuses on applying economic analysis to operations management problems, with particular emphasis on supply chain contracting, supply chain performance, and the impact of customer behavior on service operations. Lariviere's work has been published in leading academic journals such as Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, Management Science, Operations Research, and Marketing Science, and he has contributed articles to Harvard Business Review and Sloan Management Review. He has held editorial roles in several prominent journals and has been recognized as a Distinguished Fellow of the Manufacturing and Service Operations Management Society, as well as a recipient of the Saul Gass Expository Writing Award. His academic background includes a PhD in Business from Stanford University and a BA in Economics from Yale University. Prior to his tenure at Kellogg, he was an Associate Professor at Duke University's Fuqua School of Business.

Research topics

• Computer Science
• Marketing
• Business
• Telecommunications
• Operations management
• Industrial organization
• Computer network
• Microeconomics
• Labour economics
• Economics

Selected publications

• The Queue Behind the Curtain: Information Disclosure in Omnichannel Services

  Naval Research Logistics (NRL) · 2025-08-16 · 1 citations

  articleSenior author

  ABSTRACT With evolving mobile technologies, an increasing number of service providers are running multiple channels by offering apps to serve customers. In this article, we evaluate whether providing an online ordering option through an app is necessarily beneficial for the firm and customers. In particular, we study the implications of queue‐length information disclosure on the channel choice strategy of wait‐sensitive and quality‐sensitive app users. We adopt a game‐theoretic, discrete‐time queuing framework to model customers' strategic channel choice behavior in omnichannel systems. When provided with queue‐length information in an omnichannel system, app users follow a dual‐threshold policy where they order online for moderate queue lengths and choose the offline option when the queue length is either too short or too long. If non‐app users are relatively more wait‐sensitive, the overall throughput might be lower in the omnichannel system compared to the single‐channel benchmark. On the other hand, if app users are relatively more wait‐sensitive, then the omnichannel system increases throughput. From the customer's perspective, whether or not providing online ordering benefits her depends on the relative market size and the relative wait‐sensitivities of the non‐app user and app user segments. While non‐app users are consistently worse off in omnichannel systems, app users certainly benefit from omnichannel systems when queue‐length information is disclosed. It is indeed possible that both segments might be worse off in an omnichannel system. The firm may use information disclosure in an omnichannel system as an operational lever to increase throughput when app users are either highly quality‐sensitive or highly wait‐sensitive, or when the system is highly congested. Evaluating the overall performance of an omnichannel firm requires a careful calibration of customer primitives and consideration of the relative proportions of non‐app users and app users in the system.

  PublisherDOI

• Is Full Price the Full Story When Consumers Have Time and Budget Constraints?

  Manufacturing & Service Operations Management · 2023 · 2 citations

  • Microeconomics
  • Economics
  • Business

  Problem definition: A canonical model in service management assumes that consumers base the purchase of a service on its full price, that is, a linear combination of the monetary price and the expected time commitment. Although analytically convenient, when this assumption holds is an unexplored question. Methodology/results: We present a model of consumers allocating their time and money between working, overhead activities that do not provide utility, one continuous leisure activity, and one discrete service. Both continuous leisure activity and discrete service increase utility. Consumers can allocate any nonnegative amount of time or money to the leisure activity. Consumption of the discrete service requires a specific amount of time and money. We examine when the decision to purchase the discrete service depends only on its full price. We show that the full-price assumption does hold in specific cases. To be precise, it depends on how consumers are paid. If consumers completely control the amount of time that they work and earn a constant wage, they base their purchase decision on the full price. If, however, they must work a fixed shift length, then the assumption fails, and the full price is not sufficient to determine the consumer’s action. This leads to systematic differences in sellers’ strategies when they serve consumers with different compensation structures. If the consumers must work longer than would be optimal if they controlled their schedule and earned the same hourly wage, that is, the consumers are overemployed shift workers, then a seller restricts sales (relative to selling to consumers who control their work hours), and the system is less congested. The reverse holds if the consumers would prefer to work longer at the offered wage; that is, the consumers are underemployed shift workers. Managerial implications: We show that sellers who fail to take prevailing compensation structures of the community they serve into consideration experience significant revenue loss. In some cases, we see losses in consumer surplus and social welfare as well. Supplemental Material: The e-companion is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.0357 .

  PublisherDOI

• Cents of Urgency: How Opening a Co-located Urgent Care Center Affects Emergency Department Arrivals

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2023-01-01

  articleOpen accessSenior author
  PublisherDOI

• Is Full Price the Full Story When Consumers Have Time and Budget Constraints?

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2022-01-01

  articleOpen access
  PublisherDOI

• The BAT Case: Putting Tech Support on the Fast Track

  Kellogg School of Management Cases · 2022-03-11

  article1st authorCorresponding

  Rich Grayson, vice president for customer support at software company Bruce-Alfred Technologies (BAT), was preparing to meet with the firm's CEO and other senior executives to discuss how improving call center performance while controlling costs. BAT's support call center had experienced a significant increase in call volume over the past several quarters, and customer service had declined; waiting times were long, and call abandonment rates were high. Outside consultants had proposed a program called Fast Track, which would give customers the option of paying a fee to access tech support with a very short wait. The idea had the potential to solve some of the problems affecting customer relationships–and also to benefit the bottom line–but it violated one of BAT's key points of marketplace differentiation: offering free technical support for all BAT products.

  PublisherDOI

• Promotional Design for Small Businesses: The Operational Value of Online Deals

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2021 · 2 citations

  Senior authorCorresponding
  • Computer Science
  • Business
  • Marketing
  PublisherDOI

• The Queue Behind the Curtain: Information Disclosure in Omnichannel Services

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2020 · 8 citations

  Senior authorCorresponding
  • Computer Science
  • Business
  • Computer Science
  PublisherDOI

• Announcing Waiting Time in Emergency Departments

  Kellogg School of Management Cases · 2019-01-24

  article1st authorCorresponding

  First National Healthcare (FNH) runs a large network of hospitals and has worked to systematically reduce waiting times in its emergency departments. One of FNH's regional networks has run a successful marketing campaign promoting its low ED waiting times that other regions want to emulate. The corporate quality manager must now determine whether to allow these campaigns to be rolled out and, if so, which waiting time estimates to use. Are the numbers currently being reported accurate? Is there a more accurate way of estimating patient waiting time that can be easily understood by consumers?

  PublisherDOI

• Operations in the On-Demand Economy: Staffing Services with Self-Scheduling Capacity

  Springer series in supply chain management · 2019-01-01 · 209 citations

  book-chapter
  PublisherDOI

• Announcing Waiting Time in Emergency Departments

  Kellogg School of Management eBooks · 2019-01-01

  book1st authorCorresponding
  PublisherDOI

Frequent coauthors

• Gérard P. Cachon

  William P. Wharton Trust

  8 shared

• Achal Bassamboo

  5 shared

• Itai Gurvich

  Northwestern University

  4 shared

• Sunil Chopra

  Northwestern University

  3 shared

• Eren B. Çil

  University of Oregon

  3 shared

• Simin Li

  Shandong Normal University

  3 shared

• Jan A. Van Mieghem

  2 shared

• Lauren Xiaoyuan Lu

  2 shared

Labs

• Operations LabPI

Awards & honors

• Saul Gass Expository Writing Award
• Distinguished Fellow, Manufacturing and Service Operations M…
• Distinguished Service Award, Manufacturing and Service Opera…
• Manufacturing and Service Operations Management Best Paper (…