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Gnanalingam Anandalingam

· Professor

University of Maryland, College Park · Information Studies

Active 1981–2020

h-index26
Citations2.9k
Papers1031 last 5y
Funding
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About

G. “Anand” Anandalingam is the Ralph J. Tyser Professor of Management Science at the Robert H. Smith School of Business at the University of Maryland. He has served as Dean of the Smith School of Business from 2007 to 2013 and was Dean of Imperial College Business School at Imperial College London from August 2013 to July 2016. Prior to joining the Smith School in 2001, Anandalingam was at the University of Pennsylvania for nearly 15 years, where he was a professor in both the Penn Engineering School and the Wharton School of Business. His academic career includes numerous awards, scholarships, fellowships, prizes, and endowed appointments at Harvard, Cambridge, and Pennsylvania. Anandalingam has published more than 100 papers and 4 books, and his research has evolved across various fields including economic dynamics and policy, energy and environmental systems analysis, telecommunications and information systems design and pricing, technology strategy, and social entrepreneurship. He has played a significant role in establishing entrepreneurial and social innovation programs, creating international partnerships, and promoting diversity in academic leadership.

Research topics

  • Statistics
  • Mathematics

Selected publications

  • Decision Making Under Uncertainty in Thailand's Energy Sector1

    Routledge eBooks · 2020

    1st authorCorresponding
    • Mathematics
    • Statistics

    In recent years Thailand has had major natural gas, oil and lignite discoveries and has oriented its energy and economic development plans to utilize these resources. These activities are subject to considerable uncertainties. The quantity and timing of resource supply are stochastic as is the demand for natural gas and lignite due to the capacity expansion plans of the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) and the fuel based industrialization plans of the Eastern Seaboard Development (ESDB) project. Given these uncertainties, the important decisions that have to be made are the speed of implementing the EGAT and ESDB plans, the fuels to be used in future power plants, the rate of development of the supply of natural gas and lignite, and associated plans for infrastructural investment in NG pipelines.

  • Mathematical programming in electric power capacity investment planning

    2013-08-01

    articleSenior author
  • Customized Bundle Pricing for Information Goods: A Nonlinear Mixed-Integer Programming Approach

    Management Science · 2008-03-01 · 143 citations

    articleOpen accessSenior author

    This paper proposes using nonlinear mixed-integer programming to solve the customized bundle-pricing problem in which consumers are allowed to choose up to N goods out of a larger pool of J goods. Prior work has suggested that this mechanism has attractive features for the pricing of information and other low-marginal cost goods. Although closed-form solutions exist for this problem for certain cases of consumer preferences, many interesting scenarios cannot be easily handled without a numerical solution procedure. In this paper, we investigate the efficiency gains created by customized bundling over the alternatives of pure bundling or individual sale under different assumptions about customer preferences and firm cost structure, as well as the potential loss of efficiency caused by pricing with incomplete information about consumer reservation values. Our analysis suggests that customized bundling enhances sellers' profits and enhances welfare when consumers do not place positive values on all goods, and that this consumer characteristic is much more important than the shape of the valuation distribution in determining the optimal pricing scheme. We also find that customized bundling outperforms both pure bundling and individual sale in the presence of incomplete information, and that customized bundling still outperforms other simpler pricing schemes even when exact consumer valuations are not known ex ante.

  • Telecommunications Planning: Innovations in Pricing, Network Design and Management

    Operations research, computer science. Interface series · 2006-01-01 · 21 citations

    bookSenior author
  • Introduction to the Special Issue on Electronic Markets

    Management Science · 2005-03-01 · 10 citations

    article1st authorCorresponding
  • Iterative Combinatorial Auctions with Bidder-Determined Combinations

    Management Science · 2005-03-01 · 44 citations

    article

    In combinatorial auctions, multiple distinct items are sold simultaneously and a bidder may place a single bid on a set (package) of distinct items. The determination of packages for bidding is a nontrivial task, and existing efficient formats require that bidders know the set of packages and/or their valuations. In this paper, we extend an efficient ascending combinatorial auction mechanism to use approximate single-item pricing. The single-item prices in each round are derived from a linear program that is constructed to reflect the current allocation of packages. Introduction of approximate single-item prices allows for endogenous bid determination where bidders can discover packages that were not included in the original bid set. Due to nonconvexities, single-item prices may not exist that are exact marginal values. We show that the use of approximate single-item prices with endogenous bidding always produces allocations that are at least as efficient as those from bidding with a fixed set of packages based on package pricing. A network resource allocation example is given that illustrates the benefits of our endogenous bidding mechanism.

  • The Landscape of Electronic Market Design

    Management Science · 2005-03-01 · 77 citations

    article1st authorCorresponding

    This paper presents an introductory survey for this special issue of Management Science on electronic markets. We acquaint the reader with some fundamental concepts in the study of electronic market mechanisms, while simultaneously presenting a survey and summary of the essential literature in this area. Along the way, we position each of the papers presented in this special issue within the existing literature, demonstrating the deep impact of these 14 articles on an already broad body of knowledge.

  • The winner's curse in high tech [telecommunication industry

    Computer · 2005-03-01 · 3 citations

    article1st authorCorresponding

    The recent book, Beware the Winner's Curse: Victories that Can Sink You and Your Company (Oxford Univ. Press, 2004), outlines a number of cases in which companies experienced the winner's curse, presents industry-specific ideas, and offers a general framework for improving management decision making in these circumstances. The winner's curse is especially prevalent in technology given the importance and size of this economic sector. The US wireless spectrum auction fiasco and Lucent Technologies' disastrous acquisitions of several optical networking startups are two examples of this phenomenon.

  • A New Pricing Model for Competitive Telecommunications Services Using Congestion Discounts

    INFORMS journal on computing · 2005-05-01 · 48 citations

    articleSenior author

    We propose a two-stage pricing approach that enables providers of telecommunications services to guarantee quality of service (QoS) to their customers. The scheme is intended to shift demand during congestion periods to periods of lower demand by offering price discounts as an incentive to users to delay service during the high-demand periods. The price-discount offers act as a congestion-avoidance scheme that also balances communication traffic across different time periods. To get the scheme to work, we provide methods to evaluate when to offer the discounting scheme, estimate what proportion of customers accept the discounts, and how much the price discounts should be. In addition to offering a novel pricing structure, we show the optimal solution to the problem can be computed in a sequential manner from one period to the next, greatly simplifying implementation. Furthermore, we develop the model under uncertainty to emphasize the key implementation features of simple computations that can be performed in real time using sampled information online. We use simulations to demonstrate the scheme’s usefulness in regulating peak period demand.

  • Pricing strategies for information goods

    Sadhana · 2005-04-01 · 34 citations

    articleSenior author

Frequent coauthors

  • Lian Chen

    Zhejiang University-University of Edinburgh Institute

    12 shared
  • Chen Lian

    Sichuan University

    6 shared
  • Mark Westfall

    5 shared
  • Henry C. Lucas

    Binus University

    5 shared
  • Shin-yi Wu

    Arizona State University

    4 shared
  • Henry C. Lucas

    University of Sussex

    4 shared
  • Peter C. Fetterolf

    Ford Motor Company (United States)

    3 shared
  • Keesung Nam

    AT&T (United States)

    3 shared

Awards & honors

  • Numerous academic and teaching awards while at the Smith Sch…
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