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James Anton

James Anton

· Clinical Professor of Economics

Duke University · Operations Management

Active 1984–2021

h-index20
Citations2.7k
Papers56
Funding
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About

James J. Anton is the Wesley A. Magat Professor in the Economics Area at the Fuqua School of Business at Duke University. He also holds secondary appointments in the Department of Economics at Duke and at UNC. He received his Ph.D. in Economics from Stanford University in 1984 and joined the Fuqua faculty in 1989 after serving on the faculty at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. Professor Anton's research interests are in applied microeconomic theory and industrial organization economics, with a focus on issues involving information, incentives, contracting, and property rights in markets characterized by strategic rivalry between firms. His work has addressed topics such as innovation incentives, intellectual property rights, competitive pricing and sourcing, procurement contracts, auctions, incentive regulations, and antitrust issues. He has published extensively in prominent economics journals and currently serves on the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics. Throughout his career, he has been recognized for his teaching, receiving awards such as the Outstanding Professor Award from the Global Executive Classes and the Bank of America Faculty Award. He has also served as Faculty Dean for Fuqua from 2012 to 2015.

Research topics

  • Economics
  • Business
  • Microeconomics
  • Industrial organization
  • Law and economics

Selected publications

  • Issue Information

    The RAND Journal of Economics · 2021-03-01

    paratextOpen access

    Rest of World), 452 (Europe), 355 (UK

  • DYNAMIC PRICE COMPETITION WITH CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS AND A STRATEGIC BUYER

    UNC Libraries · 2021-08-14

    articleOpen access

    We analyze a simple dynamic durable good oligopoly model where sellers are capacity constrained. Two incumbent sellers and potential entrants choose their capacities at the start of the game. We solve for equilibrium capacity choices and the (necessarily mixed) pricing strategies. In equilibrium, the buyer splits the order with positive probability to preserve competition

  • Issue Information

    The RAND Journal of Economics · 2020-06-01

    paratextOpen access

    Identifying productivity when it is a factor of production

  • Issue Information

    The RAND Journal of Economics · 2019-10-28

    paratextOpen access

    Rest of World), 430 (Europe), 338 (UK

  • Issue Information

    The RAND Journal of Economics · 2018-11-12

    paratextOpen access

    Rest of World), 405 (Europe), 318 (UK

  • Adverse Selection

    Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · 2018-01-01 · 1 citations

    book-chapter1st authorCorresponding
  • Issue Information

    The RAND Journal of Economics · 2018-08-24

    paratextOpen access

    remedy: optimal two-stage procurement with private R&D efficiency BIN LIU and JINGFENG LU

  • Adverse Selection

    Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · 2016-01-01

    book-chapter1st authorCorresponding
  • DYNAMIC PRICE COMPETITION WITH CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS AND A STRATEGIC BUYER

    International Economic Review · 2014-07-28 · 26 citations

    articleOpen access1st author

    We analyze a simple dynamic durable good model. Two incumbent sellers and potential entrants choose their capacities at the start of the game. We solve for equilibrium capacity choices and the (necessarily mixed) pricing strategies. In equilibrium, the buyer splits the order with positive probability to preserve competition, making it possible that a high and low price seller both have sales. Sellers command a rent above the value of unmet demand by the other seller. A buyer benefits from either a commitment not to make future purchases or by hiring an agent to always buy from the lowest priced seller.

  • adverse selection

    Palgrave Macmillan eBooks · 2013-10-07

    book-chapter1st authorCorresponding

    The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Strategic Management has been written by an international team of leading academics, practitioners and rising stars and contains almost 550 individually commissioned entri

Frequent coauthors

  • Dennis A. Yao

    Dana-Farber/Harvard Cancer Center

    37 shared
  • Gary Biglaiser

    15 shared
  • Nikolaos Vettas

    Athens University of Economics and Business

    10 shared
  • Giuseppe Lopomo

    Duke University

    4 shared
  • Sandro Brusco

    Stony Brook University

    4 shared
  • Paul Gertler

    National Bureau of Economic Research

    3 shared
  • James H. Vander Weide

    3 shared
  • Tracy R. Lewis

    3 shared

Awards & honors

  • Outstanding Professor Award from the Global Executive Classe…
  • Bank of America Faculty Award (2007)
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