
Jesse Driscoll
· Professor; Chair, Global Leadership InstituteVerifiedUniversity of California, San Diego · Political Science and International Affairs
Active 1954–2026
About
I am a Professor of Political Science at the School of Global Policy and Strategy at the University of California at San Diego. My main area of research is comparative state-building dynamics.
Research topics
- Sociology
- Medicine
- Political Science
- Computer Science
- Social Science
- Economics
- Development economics
- Economic growth
- Demography
- Demographic economics
- Geography
- Psychology
- Socioeconomics
- History
- Virology
- Social psychology
- Law
- Economic history
Selected publications
Nationalities Papers · 2026-02-20
article1st authorCorrespondingEthnic stacking in the Russian armed forces? Findings from a leaked dataset
Post-Soviet Affairs · 2025-03-28 · 1 citations
articleOpen access1st authorThe ethnic composition of the Russian armed forces has been a source of popular speculation since the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The literature suggests that in militaries where promotions occur on non-merit characteristics – such as ethnicity – a result can be lower morale, less information sharing, weaker cohesion, and ultimately inferior battlefield performance. Although studies of the “ethnic factor” in the imperial and Soviet armies abound, scholars lack microdata on the modern Russian military. Using a leaked dataset of information on almost 120,000 Russian service members, we show how ethnic inequalities and group hierarchies were reflected in the manpower of the Russian armed forces that invaded Ukraine in February 2022.
Public Choice · 2025-02-24 · 2 citations
articleOpen access1st authorCorrespondingAbstract Why did the Minsk Accords fail to prevent the current Ukraine War? Standard explanations for the diplomatic failure center on irreconcilable commitment problems between Moscow and Washington: both revisionist with respect to the other, neither able to credibly promise non-involvement in the other’s perceived sphere of influence, and both capable of recruiting local allies within Ukraine. This account omits relevant historical context related to the demographic legacy of the Soviet Union. To shed light on the kinds of policies that would be most effective at “buying peace” in some dimly-visible future, we analyze a simple model of domestic Ukrainian interest group politics.
PubMed · 2024-01-01 · 2 citations
articleOpen accessBackground: Recent literature indicates that COVID-19 infection is a negative predictor of good outcomes following elective orthopedic surgery. However, the ideal timing of surgery after infection is unclear. The purpose of this study was to compare the rates of post-operative complications between those who underwent elective orthopedic surgery <50 days and >50 days after COVID-19 infection. Methods: This is a pilot study utilizing retrospective review of 28 adult subjects who underwent orthopedic surgery including 17 total-knee arthroplasties, seven total-hip arthroplasties, three posterior spinal fusions, and one common peroneal decompression. These subjects were indicated for an orthopedic surgery that was canceled due to positive pre-operative COVID-19 testing. The subjects were rescheduled for surgery between March 2020-December 2022.There were two cohorts: those who underwent surgery <50 days after COVID-19 infection (n=14) and subjects who underwent surgery >50 days after COVID-19 infection (n=14). Demographics, preoperative comorbid conditions, and post-operative complications were recorded and compared. Results: There were no significant demographic differences between the two cohorts with respect to age, body mass index, weight, and American Society of Anesthesiologists (ASA) grade. The two cohorts had no significant difference in pre-existing comorbid conditions with hypertension and peripheral vascular disease being the most common comorbidities overall. There were six postoperative complications involving four subjects within 90 days of surgery. One subject developed a postoperative pulmonary embolism (PE), and another subject developed a surgical-site infection, sepsis, and renal failure; both in the >50 days cohort. One patient in each cohort required reoperation. There was no difference in postoperative complications such as deep vein thrombosis (DVT), PE, sepsis, renal failure, and intensive care unit (ICU) admission between the two cohorts. Conclusion: .
CONSOLIDATING A WEAK STATE AFTER CIVIL WAR:
University of Pittsburgh Press eBooks · 2024-02-13 · 1 citations
book-chapter1st authorCorresponding“The Russian Spring” (Eastern Ukraine)
Cambridge University Press eBooks · 2023-01-05
book-chapterSenior authorChapter 6 is the second part of our analytic narrative. We describe coordination failure by Russian-speaking elites trying to decide whether or not they wanted to try to emulate Crimea. The chapter contrasts the orderly spectacle of irredentist annexation in Crimea with the chaotic “Russian Spring” across Eastern and Southern Ukraine. The existential question was whether the interstate border would change again. The Party of Regions had imploded, so there was no mechanism of transregional cooperation. Dozens of Russian-speaking communities each had to decide locally whether sedition or loyalty to Kyiv would prevail. Russia attempted, but failed, to use a television narrative to encourage established elites in the East to back secessionist uprisings. Sedition did not really get off the ground in most Russian-speaking communities, as pro-Ukraine militias became dominant in the streets. By early May, anti-Kyiv protests died down most everywhere – except in the Donbas.
Formalizing a Story of Why Putin Chose War
2023-01-05
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Irredentist Annexation (Crimea)
Cambridge University Press eBooks · 2023-01-05
book-chapterSenior authorChapter 5 is the first part of our analytic narrative. We describe equilibrium selection in the immediate aftermath of the Maidan events. The first theater was Crimea. The question was whether Russian-speaking elites in peripheral communities would accept the first storyline (“Dignity”) and remain loyal to the Ukrainian state, or accept the second storyline (“coup”) and opt for sedition. Elites in Crimea coordinated rapidly on sedition. The only militias in the streets were pro-Russia (though a brave pro-Ukraine demonstration by Crimean Tatars is described). Russian soldiers arrived to secure parliament. The Party of Regions networks served a coordinating function, repurposing state institutions to legitimize the Russian presence and ensuring institutional continuity. Crimeans voted, Russia claimed self-determination, and the government in Kyiv was checkmated. Coordinated sedition was a fait accompli.
Cambridge University Press eBooks · 2023-01-05
book-chapterSenior authorChapter 3 tests our theory against the historical record. It introduces readers to a few contentious episodes in recent Ukrainian history, focusing on three major crises between 1991 and 2014. Our analytic narrative emphasizes that Russian-speaking communities can embrace “the Russian narrative” at critical junctures theatrically, in order to maximize their bargaining leverage or demonstrate an ability to destabilize Ukrainian national politics, and then be bought off. In each of three case studies, we document Russian-speaking elites bargaining in strikingly similar ways: provoking crises at the center, knowing that Russias military casts a shadow over regional bargaining dynamics. The Party of Regions is described as a machine for aggregating preferences across multiple constituencies with a strong base in the Donbas – the primary driver of the controversial language law of 2012.
A Theory of War Onset in Post-Soviet Eurasia
Cambridge University Press eBooks · 2023-01-05 · 1 citations
book-chapterSenior authorChapter 2 presents a statement of the book’s theory. The geography and demography of the post-Soviet space suggests a strategic game with three actors, all second-guessing each others strategies: peripheral elites in Russian-speaking communities, “national” elites in the capital, and elites in the Kremlin. The output of bargaining processes is the distribution of symbolic cultural goods. The game is played in two stages. In the first, inside Russian-speaking communities, elites attempt to coordinate to threaten to secede, or not. In the second stage, bargaining takes place between the capital and the potentially seditious community. If bargaining breaks down, the Russian government might intervene. We outline the analytic narrative structure that organizes the remainder of the book. The theory is formalized in a mathematical appendix (Appendix A).
Frequent coauthors
- 9 shared
Dominique Arel
University of Ottawa
- 5 shared
Konstantin Sonin
- 4 shared
Daniel Maliniak
William & Mary
- 3 shared
Austin L. Wright
- 3 shared
Timothy K. Blauvelt
- 3 shared
Elaine K. Denny
- 3 shared
Jarnickae Wilson
- 2 shared
Caroline E. Schuster
Labs
Jesse Driscoll LabPI
Education
- 2009
PhD, Political Science
Stanford University
Awards & honors
- Best Book in the Social Sciences by the Central Eurasian Stu…
- Furniss Award
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