
Matthew O. Jackson
· William D. Eberle Professor of EconomicsVerifiedStanford University · Economics
Active 1939–2026
About
Matthew O. Jackson is the William D. Eberle Professor of Economics at Stanford University and an external faculty member of the Santa Fe Institute. He received his BA from Princeton University in 1984 and his PhD from Stanford in 1988. His research interests include game theory, microeconomic theory, and the study of social and economic networks, on which he has published numerous articles and authored the books 'The Human Network' and 'Social and Economic Networks'. Jackson has made significant contributions to understanding how social relations shape economic outcomes and has been recognized with several honors, including membership in the National Academy of Sciences, fellowships in the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the Econometric Society, the Game Theory Society, and the Economic Theory Fellow. His accolades also include a Guggenheim Fellowship, the Social Choice and Welfare Prize, the von Neumann Award from Rajk Laszlo College, an honorary doctorate from Aix-Marseille University, and the B.E.Press Arrow Prize for Senior Economists. He has served as co-editor of prominent journals such as Games and Economic Behavior, the Review of Economic Design, and Econometrica.
Research topics
- Political Science
- Sociology
- Social psychology
- Demographic economics
- Demography
- Social Science
- Psychology
- Economics
- Economic growth
Selected publications
Data and Code for: "Behavioral Communities and the Atomic Structure of Networks"
ICPSR Data Holdings · 2026-01-01
datasetOpen access1st authorCorrespondingWhen people coordinate their behaviors with their friends—for example, choosing whether to adopt a new technology, protest against a government, or attend university—divisions within a social network can lead to contrasting norms of behavior in different parts of the network.We define a society’s atoms as groups of people who adopt the same behavior in every equilibrium. We show that the atoms are at least as coarse as blocks in stochastic block models and demonstrate that using knowledge of the atoms to seed the diffusion of a behavior significantly increases diffusion compared to seeding based on standard community detection algorithms.<br><br><br>
Data and Code for: "Behavioral Communities and the Atomic Structure of Networks"
ICPSR Data Holdings · 2026-01-01
datasetOpen access1st authorCorrespondingWhen people coordinate their behaviors with their friends—for example, choosing whether to adopt a new technology, protest against a government, or attend university—divisions within a social network can lead to contrasting norms of behavior in different parts of the network.We define a society’s atoms as groups of people who adopt the same behavior in every equilibrium. We show that the atoms are at least as coarse as blocks in stochastic block models and demonstrate that using knowledge of the atoms to seed the diffusion of a behavior significantly increases diffusion compared to seeding based on standard community detection algorithms.<br><br><br>
Be.FM: Open Foundation Models for Human Behavior
ArXiv.org · 2025-05-29
preprintOpen accessDespite their success in numerous fields, the potential of foundation models for modeling and understanding human behavior remains largely unexplored. We introduce Be.FM, one of the first open foundation models designed for human behavior modeling. Built upon open-source large language models and fine-tuned on a diverse range of behavioral data, Be.FM can be used to understand and predict human decision-making. We construct a comprehensive set of benchmark tasks for testing the capabilities of behavioral foundation models. Our results demonstrate that Be.FM can predict behaviors, infer characteristics of individuals and populations, generate insights about contexts, and apply behavioral science knowledge.
A Network Formation Model Based on Subgraphs
The Review of Economic Studies · 2025-02-25 · 20 citations
articleSenior authorAbstract We develop a new class of random graph models for the statistical estimation of network formation—subgraph generated models (SUGMs). Various subgraphs—e.g. links, triangles, cliques, stars—are generated and their union results in a network. We show that SUGMs are identified and establish the consistency and asymptotic distribution of parameter estimators in empirically relevant cases. We show that a simple four-parameter SUGM matches basic patterns in empirical networks more closely than four standard models (with many more dimensions): (1) stochastic block models; (2) models with node-level unobserved heterogeneity; (3) latent space models; and (4) exponential random graphs. We illustrate the framework’s value via several applications using networks from rural India. We study whether network structure helps enforce risk-sharing and whether cross-caste interactions are more likely to be private. We also develop a new central limit theorem for correlated random variables, which is required to prove our results and is of independent interest.
ArXiv.org · 2025-06-12
preprintOpen accessSenior authorWe provide an overview of methods for designing and implementing experiments (field, lab, hybrid, and natural) when there are networks of interactions between subjects.
SSRN Electronic Journal · 2025-01-01
preprintOpen accessSenior authorArXiv.org · 2025-03-20
preprintOpen accessSenior authorBy varying prompts to a large language model, we can elicit the full range of human behaviors in a variety of different scenarios in classic economic games. By analyzing which prompts elicit which behaviors, we can categorize and compare different strategic situations, which can also help provide insight into what different economic scenarios induce people to think about. We discuss how this provides a first step towards a non-standard method of inferring (deciphering) the motivations behind the human behaviors. We also show how this deciphering process can be used to categorize differences in the behavioral tendencies of different populations.
Be.FM: Open Foundation Models for Human Behavior
SSRN Electronic Journal · 2025-01-01
preprintOpen accessWelfare optimization for resource allocation with peer effects
PNAS Nexus · 2025-08-30
articleOpen accessAbstract Allocating students to schools or universities, people to teams or groups, people to urban housing, and matching users on social platforms are prominent examples of allocating limited goods, spaces, or positions to optimize social welfare. We study a welfare maximization problem that arises when such resource allocation scenarios involve peer effects, where people have preferences over the others who are nearby (e.g. their classmates, teammates, neighbors, or partners). We first develop a unified mathematical framework for this “position allocation problem,” which assigns people to positions in a given network, with people caring about both their positions and their neighbors’ attributes. We show that welfare maximization for the corresponding position allocation problem is computationally intractable, even when people have preferences that depend only on who is allocated to nearby positions, and those preferences satisfy simple constraints that arise naturally in urban and other real-world systems. In contrast to this computational lower bound, we show that if people can be classified into a fixed number of (demographic) groups and the network satisfies certain realistic spatial conditions, then efficiently computable allocations can be obtained for many natural scenarios. Importantly, the achieved social welfare is either optimal or arbitrarily close to optimal for natural forms of preferences. Our methods provide a foundation for position allocation with peer effects, and guide the design of optimal allocation strategies when people can be classified into a fixed number of groups in which members share similar preferences.
Using Language Models to Decipher the Motivation Behind Human Behaviors
SSRN Electronic Journal · 2025-01-01 · 2 citations
preprintOpen accessSenior author
Recent grants
NSF · $278k · 2016–2020
Collaborative Research: Social Networks and Microfinance
NSF · $73k · 2012–2015
Studies of Social Structure and Economic Behavior
NSF · $303k · 2010–2014
NSF · $394k · 2020–2024
Studies of Social Structure and Economic Behavior
NSF · $177k · 2007–2011
Frequent coauthors
- 83 shared
Arun G. Chandrasekhar
National Bureau of Economic Research
- 50 shared
Leeat Yariv
Centre for Economic Policy Research
- 43 shared
Philippe Aghion
Collège de France
- 40 shared
Abhijit Banerjee
- 39 shared
Daron Acemoğlu
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- 37 shared
Esther Duflo
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
- 34 shared
Yves Zénou
Monash University
- 26 shared
Benjamin Golub
Education
- 1984
B.A.
Princeton University
- 1988
Ph.D.
Stanford University
Awards & honors
- Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences
- Fellow of the Econometric Society
- Game Theory Society Fellow
- Economic Theory Fellow
- Guggenheim Fellowship
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