About

Maxim Engers is a professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Virginia. His fields of interest include the economics of information and applied game theory. He holds a Bachelor of Arts from the University of Cape Town, a Master of Arts from the University of California System at Los Angeles, and a Doctor of Philosophy from the University of California System at Los Angeles. His research includes topics such as equilibrium and optimum, private information, market entry, coordination, R&D policy with international spillovers, and charity auctions. He has authored several publications in reputable journals and encyclopedias, contributing to the understanding of economic behavior and market dynamics.

Research topics

• Computer Science
• Computer Security
• Economics
• Microeconomics
• Mathematical economics

Selected publications

• A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium with Private Information

  SSRN Electronic Journal · 2025-01-01

  preprintOpen access1st authorCorresponding
  PublisherDOI

• A Dynamic Model of Equilibrium with Private Information

  2024

  1st authorCorresponding
  • Computer Science
  • Mathematical economics
  • Economics
  PublisherDOI

• Automobile Maintenance Costs, Used Cars, and Private Information

  2012-01-01 · 3 citations

  article1st authorCorresponding

  Since Akerlofs (1970) foundational work on lemons markets, economists have been investigating how di¤erences in information about product quality nega-tively a¤ect the amount of trade in durable goods. Cardon and Hendel (2001), Hendel, Lizzeri, and Siniscalchi (2005), and Engers, Hartmann, and Stern (2009a)

  Publisher

• Automobile Maintenance Costs, Used Cars, and Adverse Selection

  2011-01-01 · 5 citations

  article1st authorCorresponding

  Since Akerlof’s (1970) seminal work on “lemons” markets, economists have been investigating how the lack of information on product quality affects the decision to sell durable goods. Engers, Hartmann, and Stern (2004b) (EHSb) Þnds, in a dynamic setting with sufficient heterogeneity in tastes, the trade-inhibiting effects of private information are less severe than previously thought. Newcar owners whose utility falls rapidly with declines in quality maintain them well and yet sell them soon after buying them. On the other hand, new-car owners whose utility does not fall rapidly with declines in quality hold them for long periods and maintain them poorly. The unobservable heterogeneity in car quality that drives selling decisions is not constant, speciÞc to a car, but rather varies across owners of the same car. This suggests that the lemons problem is due to individual owners’ decisions rather than manufacturers’. EHSb shows theoretically how the owner’s maintenance decision determines unobservable car quality and insuences the decision to sell. In equilibrium, the owner will not incur maintenance expenditures to raise a car’s quality if he intends to sell it. Because quality is unobservable, he will be unable to pass the costs onto potential buyers. The literature has yet to substantiate empirically that it is the maintenance decision and not another decision by the owner that drives the decision to sell. Because of data limitations, EHSb does not examine empirically the link between maintenance and selling. Using a different dataset, this paper tries to clarify the role unobserved maintenance expenditures plays in the selling decision. Our results suggest that unobserved maintenance costs do not affect selling decisions. We estimate a model of the household decision to sell (scrap) a vehicle as a function of the household’s characteristics, the vehicle’s age and changes in maintenance costs as predicted by the car’s characteristics. The methodology decomposes changes in car costs into observed and unobserved components and

  Publisher

• Annual miles drive used car prices

  2009-01-01

  article1st authorCorresponding

  Abstract: This paper investigates whether changes in vehicle’s net benefits, proxied by annual miles driven, explain the observed pattern of price declines over a vehicle’s life. We first model the household’s decision on how much to drive each of its vehicles using two alternative approaches. The first approach is a basic nonstructural approach that restricts the rela-tionship between annual mileage and the household’s characteristics to be linear across the vehicle’s life. The second approach is a structural model that allows for nonlinearity. It takes into account how the composition of vehicles owned- the number and the age distribution of the vehicles-influence which household car is drive on a particular trip and how much it is driven. We then use the mileage estimates to determine if the varia-tion in household-mileage decision across brands can explain the pricing paths observed for used cars. Results indicate that the structural esti-mates of the household mileage decision better predict changes in prices over a vehicle’s life. The superiority of the structural estimates implies that the effect vehicle age has on mileage decisions (and consequently the vehicle’s market value) cannot be estimated independently of household characteristics and the composition of the vehicle stock owned. Thus, one must account for these feedback effects when using mileage to control for exogenously depreciated quality. The results strongly suggest that varia-tion in net benefits of specific brand/vintage vehicles significantly affects variation in used car prices. 1

  Publisher

• Annual miles drive used car prices

  Journal of Applied Econometrics · 2008-10-24 · 34 citations

  articleOpen access1st author

  Abstract This paper investigates whether the net benefits from owning a vehicle, proxied by annual miles driven, explain the price declines observed over a vehicle's life. We first model the household decision on how much to drive each of its vehicles. Then we empirically establish that variation in household annual miles across brands explains observed price declines. Furthermore, the effect of vehicle age on annual miles decisions (and consequently on market value) depends on household characteristics and the composition of the vehicle stock owned. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• Are lemons really hot potatoes?

  International Journal of Industrial Organization · 2008-09-07

  article1st author
  PublisherDOI

• CHARITY AUCTIONS*

  International Economic Review · 2007-07-17 · 73 citations

  article1st author

  In a charity auction the public‐goods nature of auction revenue affects bidding incentives. We compare equilibrium bidding and revenue in first‐price, second‐price, and all‐pay charity auctions. Bidding revenue typically varies by selling format. First‐price auctions are less lucrative than second‐price and all‐pay auctions, and with sufficiently many bidders the all‐pay auction has the highest bidding revenue. However, revenue equivalence applies when the auctioneer can set a reserve price and fees plus threaten to cancel the auction. If the auctioneer cannot threaten cancellation, a reserve and bidding fee can augment revenue but again revenue varies by auction format

  PublisherDOI

• Participation games: Market entry, coordination, and the beautiful blonde

  Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · 2006-04-05 · 6 citations

  articleOpen accessSenior author
  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• R&D policy with layers of economic integration

  European Economic Review · 2005-08-16 · 7 citations

  article1st author
  PublisherDOI

Frequent coauthors

• Steven Stern

  12 shared

• Simon P. Anderson

  Center for Economic and Policy Research

  10 shared

• Monica Hartmann

  9 shared

• Jonathan Eaton

  5 shared

• Joshua S. Gans

  University of Toronto

  4 shared

• Steven Stern

  4 shared

• Simon Grant

  3 shared

• Shannon K. Mitchell

  Virginia Commonwealth University

  2 shared