Mikhail Klimenko
· Associate ProfessorVerifiedGeorgia Institute of Technology · Economics
Active 1998–2023
About
Dr. Mikhail Klimenko received his PhD in Business from Stanford University and joined the Georgia Tech faculty as an Associate Professor of Economics in 2004. His research specializes in international trade theory, telecommunications economics, and digital markets, with a focus on how market structure, technological change, and policy interventions influence international trade, innovation, and the diffusion of digital technologies. His work examines global digital platforms, technology transfer, foreign direct investment policies, and platform governance, often employing microeconomic foundations to provide policy-relevant insights. Professor Klimenko has authored multiple papers and book chapters, and his recent publications include studies on digital platforms, FDI policies, and the impact of language on internet content. His research has been supported by organizations such as the National Science Foundation, Sciences Po, and the Net Institute. He has served as a reviewer for numerous economics journals and as a consultant for the World Bank. His teaching interests encompass the economics of telecommunications networks, broadband policy, e-commerce, and the legal and institutional frameworks of international trade, emphasizing case-based and data-driven pedagogy to develop students' analytical and practical skills.
Research topics
- Industrial organization
- Business
- Commerce
- Financial system
Selected publications
SSRN Electronic Journal · 2023-01-01
preprintOpen accessSenior authorEconomic Inquiry · 2023-02-08 · 4 citations
article1st authorCorrespondingAbstract This paper examines the preferences of a foreign firm and a host country government over two modes of FDI in two‐sided markets: de novo entry (through the establishment of a new platform) and acquisition of the domestic incumbent platform. Technology transfer, cross‐side network externalities and platform service differentiation determine the ranking of the host country welfare gains and the entrant's profits under the two entry modes. In the case where the foreign entrant and the host government disagree over the entry modes ranking, asymmetric foreign equity restrictions can induce the welfare‐optimal choice of the entry mode by the foreign firm.
Russian Banking Sector Under the Influence of Fintech Innovations
Advances in economics, business and management research/Advances in Economics, Business and Management Research · 2021 · 4 citations
Senior authorCorresponding- Business
- Industrial organization
- Financial system
The article highlights the main changes and prospects for the development of the banking industry under the influence of the development of financial technologies, which largely determine the future of the banking sector, dictating new formats of interaction with customers. Financial technologies stimulate the direction of evolution of the market of banking products and services. In this regard, the main purpose of this article is to reveal the features of classification and development of banking innovations in Russia, as well as to identify the problems associated with their implementation. The article analyzes the current development of the banking system, the essence of banking innovations, classification of banking products, opportunities and prospects for innovation in the banking sector. The main conclusions of this work are the advantages and disadvantages obtained by all participants in this process.
Language, Internet and Platform Competition
Journal of International Economics · 2020-01-01
preprintOpen accessSenior authorDuration and Term Structure of Trade Agreements
The Economic Journal · 2015-03-11
preprintOpen accessSenior authorWe use a dynamic incomplete contracting model to show that time structure of trade agreements is related to the characteristics of trade‐facilitating investments. If these investments are specialised to trade in a particular homogeneous good, fixed‐term agreements are more likely. Fixed‐term agreements provide incentives for the initial investment but leave the parties the flexibility to revisit the need for future investment. If the agreement covers trade in multiple sectors or differentiated goods or services, inter‐sectoral spillovers reduce risks of overinvestment. In this case, the parties are more likely to choose an evergreen agreement (with an advance termination notice).
Language, Internet and Platform Competition: The Case of Search Engine
SSRN Electronic Journal · 2012-09-01 · 4 citations
articleOpen accessSenior authorThe World Wide Web was originally a totally English-based medium due to its US origin. Although the presence of other languages has steadily risen, content in English is still dominant, which raises a natural question of how bilingualism of consumers of a home country affects production of web content in the home language and domestic welfare? In this paper, we address this question by studying how bilingualism affects competition between a foreign search engine and a domestic one within a small country and thereby production of home language content. We find that bilingualism unambiguously softens platform competition, which in turn can induce a reduction in home language content and in home country's welfare. In particular, it is possible that content in the foreign language crowds out so much content in the home language that consumers enjoy less content when they are bilingual than when they are monolingual.
Duration and Term Structure of Trade Agreements
SSRN Electronic Journal · 2009-01-01 · 1 citations
articleOpen accessSenior authorStrategic interoperability standards and trade taxes
International Review of Economics & Finance · 2008-11-26 · 9 citations
article1st authorCorrespondingJournal of International Economics · 2008-12-05 · 25 citations
article1st authorCorrespondingTechnical compatibility and the mode of foreign entry with network externalities
Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d économique · 2007-02-01 · 27 citations
articleOpen access1st authorCorrespondingAbstract. We examine the preferences of a foreign firm and a local government over two modes of foreign direct investment: de novo entry and acquisition of the domestic incumbent. Two crucial features of the model are network externalities and partial incompatibility between the domestic and the foreign technology. The relative welfare impact of the two entry modes depends on the degree of market competition and the strength of the network externality. The clash between the foreign firm's choice and the local government's ranking of the two entry modes can motivate limits on the degree of foreign ownership of the local firm.
Frequent coauthors
- 8 shared
Bruno Jullien
Toulouse School of Economics
- 7 shared
Doh‐Shin Jeon
Toulouse School of Economics
- 6 shared
Joel Watson
University of California, San Diego
- 6 shared
Garey Ramey
University of California, San Diego
- 5 shared
Михайло Миколайович Клименко
- 4 shared
Peter F. Cowhey
University of California, San Diego
- 4 shared
Ірина Іванівна Кишенько
- 4 shared
E. E. Perepelkin
Education
PhD, Graduate School of Business
Stanford University
Awards & honors
- Research support from the French Fondation Nationale des Sci…
- Served as reviewer for a number of economics journals and ex…
- Served as a consultant for the World Bank
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