About

Paul Katsafanas is a Professor of Philosophy and the Director of Graduate Studies at Boston University. He received his BA from Vassar College and his PhD from Harvard University. His research focuses on ethics, moral psychology, and nineteenth-century philosophy, especially Nietzsche. His work explores how the complexities and ambivalences of human psychology influence our relationships with ourselves, others, and the values we hold. Katsafanas has written extensively on the interplay between the conscious and unconscious mind, the challenges of self-knowledge, the nature of freedom, and the affective undercurrents of political and social life. His recent work examines how resentiment, fanaticism, and devotion shape identity and can drive political antagonism. He is the author of 'Philosophy of Devotion: The Longing for Invulnerable Ideals' (Oxford University Press, 2023), which argues that devotion plays a crucial but overlooked role in grounding meaning and value. His other notable works include 'The Nietzschean Self' (2016) and 'Agency and the Foundations of Ethics' (2013). Katsafanas is also the Executive Director of the North American Nietzsche Society.

Research topics

• Political Science
• Law
• Philosophy
• Physics
• Epistemology
• Psychology
• Quantum mechanics
• Psychoanalysis
• Literature
• History
• Art

Selected publications

• Grievance politics and identities of resentment

  Philosophical Studies · 2025-02-01 · 3 citations

  articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding
  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• Narratives of love and hate: Nietzsche on positive and negative moralities

  Inquiry · 2025-11-21

  article1st authorCorresponding
  PublisherDOI

• Devotion and deep commitment

  Philosophical Psychology · 2025-11-05

  articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding

  Devotion and deep commitmentIn the bustle of human life, making a choice is only the beginning.You decide on a career, take up a cause, enter into a romantic relationship, begin an artistic project, start an exercise regimen.It sticks, for a while.But then difficulties arise, circumstances shift, justifications waver, and motivation runs thin.Commitments that once felt obvious begin to look fragile; doubts accumulate; alternatives become salient.In these moments the question is not simply what to do but how to remain with what you have chosen.Our philosophical and psychological theories have a great deal to say about deliberation and decision.They have far less to say about sustaining commitment when confidence erodes and reasons no longer seem secure.This raises a puzzle about agency itself.Much of our theorizing in philosophy and psychology assumes that rational agents revise their attitudes in light of changing evidence and judgment.But many of our deepest commitments do not behave this way.They persist through doubt, resist reconsideration, and seem to involve a distinctive stance toward reasons and reflection.This phenomenon reveals a basic tension in our self-conception as rational agents: the very capacities that enable self-governance (reflection, critical scrutiny, responsiveness to reasons) can also threaten the attachments that make self-governance both possible and meaningful.After all, many of the activities that give shape and significance to our lives depend on this capacity to remain committed to what we've chosen, even when justifications falter.Vocations, friendships, romantic relationships, careers, artistic and intellectual endeavors, political struggles, athletic pursuits -all of these involve sustaining activities and relationships over extended periods of time.Without commitment, we would drift away from these activities, finding ourselves at the mercy of chance, passing moods, changing circumstances.But the value of commitment is not merely instrumental; it's not just an effective way of getting things done and achieving our goals.We don't value a friendship in the same way when we learn that it is matter of convenience rather than commitment; a romantic relationship that is reevaluated afresh at each moment feels deficient; a political cause abandoned at the first difficulty is hardly inspiring.In these kinds of cases, we seem to value not only the results of commitment but the commitment itself: the manner in which the person inhabits and sustains a relationship, a course of action, or

  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• What’s so bad about fanaticism?

  Synthese · 2024-06-10 · 5 citations

  articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding
  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• Fanaticism and the History of Philosophy

  2023-09-14 · 2 citations

  bookOpen access1st authorCorresponding

  Voltaire called fanaticism the "monster that pretends to be the child of religion". Philosophers, politicians, and cultural critics have decried fanaticism and attempted to define the distinctive qualities of the fanatic, whom Winston Churchill described as "someone who can't change his mind and won't change the subject". Yet despite fanaticism's role in the long history of social discord, human conflict, and political violence, it remains a relatively neglected topic in the history of philosophy. In this outstanding inquiry into the philosophical history of fanaticism a team of international contributors examine the topic from antiquity to the present day. Organised into four sections, topics covered include: Fanaticism in ancient Greek, Indian and Chinese philosophy; Fanaticism and superstition from Hobbes to Hume, including chapters on Locke and Montesquieu, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson; Kant, Germaine de Stael, Hegel, Nietzsche, William James, and Jorge Portilla on fanaticism; Fanaticism and terrorism; and extremism and gender, including the philosophy and morality of the 'manosphere'; Closed-mindedness and political and epistemological fanaticism. Spanning themes from superstition, enthusiasm and misanthropy to the emotions, purity and the need for certainty, Fanaticism and the History of Philosophy is a landmark volume for anyone researching and teaching the history of philosophy, particularly ethics and moral philosophy. It is also a valuable resource for those studying fanaticism in related fields such as religion, the history of political thought, sociology, and the history of ideas.

  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• An Introduction to the Philosophy of Fanaticism

  Routledge eBooks · 2023 · 1 citations

  1st authorCorresponding
  • Political Science
  • Epistemology
  • Philosophy

  What is fanaticism and why is it an important philosophical topic? In this introductory chapter, I discuss the way in which fanaticism arose as a central philosophical concern in the early modern period. Philosophical discussions of fanaticism focus on psychological, epistemic, and behavioral dimensions of fanatics. The fanatic displays psychological peculiarities; epistemic defects; and potentially problematic behavioral tendencies. I discuss the ways in which different philosophers have offered different accounts of these three features; offer a brief defense of my own account of fanaticism; and highlight some key questions about fanaticism. I close with an overview of the essays in this volume.

  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• The Fanatic and the Last Man

  The Journal of Nietzsche Studies · 2022-01-01 · 2 citations

  article1st authorCorresponding

  Abstract Suppose we accept Nietzsche’s claim that critical reflection undermines our evaluative commitments. Then it seems that we are left with a pair of unappealing options: either we engage in critical reflection and find our evaluative commitments becoming etiolated; or we somehow immunize certain evaluative commitments from the effects of critical reflection. Nietzsche considers both of these paths, labeling the person who results from the first path “the last man” and the person who results from the second “the fanatic.” I consider Nietzsche’s analysis of these two character types, discuss why he thinks that in modernity these are the options with which we are faced, and ask whether Nietzsche thinks that there is a third way.

  PublisherDOI

• Devotion and Dialectical Invulnerability

  2022-12-15

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding

  Abstract This chapter examines the distinctive way in which sacred values are insulated from the effects of justificatory reflection. It introduces the concept of devotion. An agent is devoted to a person, state of affairs, value, or goal iff she is committed to engaging in the relevant ways with it; this commitment is dialectically invulnerable (no rational considerations can disrupt it); and she is disposed to maintain the dialectical invulnerability of the commitment. The chapter argues that it can be rational to manifest devotion, for devotion is a precondition for the preservation of important features of ethical life. If it can be rational to devote oneself to things, and if doing so requires treating one’s commitment to these things as dialectically invulnerable, then it can be rational to render certain commitments dialectically invulnerable.

  PublisherDOI

• Fanaticism as Individual Pathology

  2022-12-15

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding

  Abstract This chapter offers a new account of fanaticism. It argues that fanaticism is based upon a constellation of psychological traits including personal fragility, a belief in the precariousness of certain values, and a form of group orientation. The fanatic is distinguished by four features: the adoption of one or more sacred values; the need to treat these values as unconditional in order to preserve her identity; the sense that the status of these values is threatened by lack of widespread acceptance; and the identification with a group, where the group is defined by shared commitment to the sacred value. The chapter explains how these features are mutually reinforcing, and it argues that these features dispose the agent towards the types of violent intolerance that we typically associate with fanaticism.

  PublisherDOI

• Group Fanaticism and Narratives of Ressentiment

  2022-12-15

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding

  Abstract This chapter focuses on a disturbing characteristic of certain contemporary groups, movements, and political ideologies: their fanatical nature. What does it mean to characterize a group, movement, or ideology as fanatical? According to the generative view of group fanaticism, a group qualifies as fanatical if and only if it promotes individual fanaticism. How might a group promote individual fanaticism? One mechanism for encouraging individual fanaticism is by advancing a group narrative that fuels the emotion of ressentiment—a vengeful, impotent hatred directed at those perceived as wronging you. The chapter explores the tendency of fanatical groups to promote ressentiment among their members, and it analyzes the ways in which ressentiment feeds individual fanaticism.

  PublisherDOI

Frequent coauthors

• Simon May

  5 shared

• Brian Leiter

  1 shared

• R. Lanier Anderson

  Stanford University

  1 shared

• Edward Harcourt

  1 shared

• Kristin Gjesdal

  Temple University

  1 shared

• Lawrence J. Hatab

  1 shared

• Christine Swanton

  University of Auckland

  1 shared

• Peter Poellner

  1 shared

Education

• PhD, Philosophy

  Harvard University

  2008