A metaphysical mapping problem for race theorists and human population geneticists

Routledge eBooks · 2021 · 1 citations

• Sociology
• Epistemology
• Sociology

I begin by identifying a mapping phenomenon that’s almost 20 years old. The phenomenon is that the populations that occur at the fivefold subdivision of Homo sapiens into biological populations correspond one-to-one with the five official races of the Office of Management and Budget in the US government. Next, I show that this mapping phenomenon raises an interesting and difficult metaphysical question, namely, ‘What is the metaphysical relation that’s exemplified by this mapping phenomenon?’ The answer I advance is that the relation is identity. Next, I defend this identity thesis using a four-step deductive argument that explores other candidate hypotheses in the philosophy of race literature, such as the relation being co-exemplification, coextension, or a function of tracking. Nevertheless, I defend the identity thesis against these rival hypotheses.

How to Be a Biological Racial Realist

2019-06-20 · 81 citations

Abstract Quayshawn Spencer shows that there is a widely used race talk in American English where race is a biological division and biologically real. That race talk is the Office of Management and Budget’s since 1997. Spencer shows that what race is, in this race talk, is just a set of five biological populations in the human species. After defending this qualified biological racial realism, Spencer shows how his qualified biological racial realism is helpful in answering the question of whether any folk racial scheme has epistemic value in medical genetics.

Glasgow’s Reply to Haslanger, Jeffers, and Spencer

2019-06-20 · 12 citations

Abstract In Chapter 4, Joshua Glasgow argued that race in the ordinary sense is defined in such a way that race cannot be a social construction and is not a biological reality. That chapter concluded with the claim that either race is not real, or if it is, it is real in a very basic way that is not captured by social or biological facts. In this chapter, Glasgow develops his view by responding to Haslanger, Jeffers, and Spencer. After first clearing up some misconceptions about racial anti-realism, Glasgow explains how his argument against constructionism applies to Haslanger’s and Jeffers’s specific constructionist theories. He then explores how Spencer’s view is exposed to a mismatch objection and further argues that it faces additional problems of accounting for some central kinds of communication. This chapter also includes an Appendix that explores how a wide methodological ground is shared among the theories presented in this book.

What Is Race?: Four Philosophical Views

2019-05-15 · 3 citations

" Across public discourse, in the media, politics, many branches of academic inquiry, and ordinary daily interactions, we spend a lot time talking about race: race relations, racial violence, discrimination based on race, racial integration, racial progress. It is fair to say that questions about race have vexed our social life. But for all we speak about race, do we know what race is? Is it a social construct or a biological object? Is it a bankrupt holdover from a time before sophisticated scientific understanding and genetics, or can it still hold up in biological, genetic, and other types of research? Most fundamentally, is race real? In this book, four prominent philosophers and race theorists debate how best to answer these difficult questions, applying philosophical tools and the principles of social justice to cutting-edge findings from the biological and social sciences. Each presents a distinct view of race: Sally Haslanger argues that race is a socio-political reality. Chike Jeffers maintains that race is not only political but also, importantly, cultural. Quayshawn Spencer pursues the idea that race is biologically real. And Joshua Glasgow argues that either race is not real, or if it is, it must be real in a way that is neither social nor biological. Each offers an argument for their own view and then replies to the others. Woven together, the result is a lively debate that opens up numerous ways of understanding race. Above all, it is call for sophisticated and principled discussion of something that significantly permeates our lives. "--

Spencer’s Reply to Glasgow, Haslanger, and Jeffers

2019-06-20 · 3 citations

Abstract Quayshawn Spencer clarifies that his defense of biological racial realism in Chapter 3—which is called “OMB race theory”—is meant to be a part of a larger radically pluralist theory about the nature and reality of race in American English. Next, Spencer defends OMB race theory against the South Asian mismatch objection from Glasgow and Jeffers. Third, Spencer raises an empirical adequacy objection against Glasgow’s, Haslanger’s, and Jeffers’s race theories insofar as they are unable to predict how race and races are talked about in multiple national discussions, such as whether Rachel Dolezal is wrong to claim a Black racial identity and whether Harvard University has been unlawfully discriminating against Asian applicants in undergraduate admissions.

Copyright Page

2019-06-27

Extract Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries. Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America. © Oxford University Press 2019 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above. You must not circulate this work in any other form

Haslanger’s Reply to Glasgow, Jeffers, and Spencer

2019-06-20 · 2 citations

Abstract The concept of race has a troublesome history. It has been used to divide societies and subordinate groups in unjust ways. It has also been a source of pride and strength for the subordinate (as well as, unfortunately, for the dominant). Historically it has also carried assumptions of naturalness: races are natural kinds that exist independent of human thought and activity. In recent years, however, the naturalness of race has been challenged and replaced with the idea that race is socially constructed. This raises many important philosophical questions: How should one inquire into the concept of race when there is such broad controversy over what race is? What are the relevant phenomena to be considered? How should this inquiry take into account the social stakes, e.g. the potential impact of maintaining or rejecting the concept of race? Is it possible for concepts to evolve, or is conceptual replacement the only option? In Chapter 1, the author took up these methodological questions and positioned herself as a critical theorist considering what role the concept of race has in the social-political domain. Here she argues that there is a meaningful political conception of race that is important in order to address the history of racial injustice. This is compatible with there being different conceptions of race that are valuable in other contexts and for different purposes, e.g. for medical research, cultural empowerment. She argues that, although on this conception race is socially constructed, the resulting notion has a claim to being “our” concept of race.

Dedication

2019-06-27

Extract To our children, Samantha Rose Glasgow-Shulman, Aminata Lilla Jeffers, Ayo Jelani Jeffers, Aza Katherine Ida Jeffers, Julian Buo-Hon Spencer, Quentin Buo-Yi Spencer, Isaac Amazu Haslanger Yablo, and Zina Siyasa Haslanger Yablo, in the hope that their generations will find a more just world.

Introduction

2019-06-20

Extract Historically, efforts to make sense of human diversity led to classifying humans by where they live, by culture or custom (including language or religion), by family or ancestry, by appearance, by personality type or temperament, by physical and intellectual capacities, and, of course, by race. But what, if anything, is distinctive of racial groups? A race is not just a group of people linked by a common ancestry. While this may account for the idea of the human race, since all living humans share a common ancestor (so-called Mitochondrial Eve, who lived about 200,000 years ago), it also would make any group of people who are biological siblings a race, which is not how anyone talks about race. Nor is a race just a group of people linked by a common geographic origin. If that were true, then African Americans and Afro-Caribbeans would be American, instead of Black, because both of these groups of people originated in the Americas, not Africa. And it is difficult to unpack race in terms of shared skin color, since people of different races can share the same skin color and people of the same race can have different skin colors.

What Is Race?

2019-06-20 · 78 citations

Abstract What is race? This is a question that has haunted human interaction and vexed scholars. In this book, four race theorists debate how best to answer it, applying philosophical tools and principles of social justice to cutting-edge findings from the biological and social sciences. Each of the authors presents a distinct view of race. Sally Haslanger argues that race is a sociopolitical reality. Chike Jeffers maintains that race is not only political but also, importantly, cultural. Quayshawn Spencer pursues the idea that race is biologically real. And Joshua Glasgow argues that either race is not real, or if it is, it must be real in a way that is neither social nor biological. Each offers an argument for their own view and then replies to the others. The result is a lively debate that shines a light on multiple ways of thinking about race.