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Raymond Fisman

Raymond Fisman

· Slater Family Professor in Behavioral EconomicsVerified

Boston University · Economics

Active 1998–2025

h-index61
Citations22.5k
Papers30454 last 5y
Funding$415k
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About

Raymond Fisman is the Slater Family Professor in Behavioral Economics at Boston University. His office is located at 270 Bay State Road, Room 304A, Boston, MA 02215. He can be contacted via email at rfisman@bu.edu or by telephone at 617-353-6821. His profile indicates a focus on behavioral economics, and he is associated with the Department of Economics at Boston University. His CV was updated in January 2026, reflecting his ongoing academic and research activities.

Research topics

  • Political Science
  • Economics
  • Sociology
  • Social Science
  • Public economics
  • Law
  • Labour economics
  • Market economy
  • Political economy
  • Monetary economics
  • Finance
  • Accounting
  • Public relations

Selected publications

  • The Undoing of Economic Sanctions: Evidence from the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

    National Bureau of Economic Research · 2025-08-01

    reportOpen access1st authorCorresponding

    We examine the effects of Ukraine's economic blockade of the anthracite-rich Donbas region, to demonstrate how trade sanctions' efficacy can be undermined by trade through non-participatory nations.We document that after the blockade was imposed in March 2017, Russia reported a sharp increase in anthracite imports from Ukraine, while Ukraine reported no exports to Russia at all.We interpret this gap in "mirror statistics" as reflecting a shift in Donbas trade through Russia.Concurrently, Ukraine anthracite imports from Russia increased sharply (from near-zero), indicating that some of the increased supply of anthracite in Russia was exported back to Ukraine.We provide suggestive evidence that Russian traders benefited from monopsony rents, buying lowpriced anthracite from Donbas while Russia sold anthracite to Ukraine at prices comparable to other export markets.Overall, our findings highlight some of the economic and geographic features that may raise the cost and limit the efficacy of sanctions.

  • The undoing of economic sanctions: Evidence from the Russia–Ukraine conflict

    Journal of Public Economics · 2025-09-01 · 3 citations

    article1st authorCorresponding
  • The costs and benefits of clan culture: elite control versus cooperation in China

    The Journal of Law Economics and Organization · 2025-11-21 · 1 citations

    article

    Abstract Kinship ties are a common institution that may facilitate in-group coordination and cooperation. Yet their benefits—or lack thereof—depend crucially on the broader institutional environment. We study how the prevalence of clan ties affect how communities confronted two well-studied historical episodes from the early years of the People’s Republic of China, utilizing four distinct proxies for county clan strength: the presence of recognized ancestral halls; genealogical records; rice suitability; and geographic latitude. We show that the loss of livestock associated with 1955–56 collectivization (which mandated that farmers surrender livestock for little compensation) documented by Chen and Lan (2017)was much less pronounced in strong-clan areas. By contrast, we show that the 1959–61 Great Famine was associated with higher mortality in areas with stronger clan ties. We argue that reconciling these two conflicting patterns requires that we take a broader view of how kinship groups interact with other governance institutions, in particular the role of kinship as a means of elite control (JEL N95, P32, Z10).

  • Revolving Door Laws and Political Selection

    National Bureau of Economic Research · 2025-03-01

    reportOpen access1st authorCorresponding

    Revolving door laws restrict public officials from representing private interests before government after leaving office.While these laws mitigate potential conflicts of interest, they also may affect the pool of candidates for public positions by lowering the financial benefits of holding office.We study the consequences of revolving door laws for political selection in U.S. state legislatures, exploiting the staggered roll-out of laws across states over time.We find that fewer new candidates enter politics in treated states and that incumbent legislators are less likely to leave office, leading to an increase in uncontested elections.The decline in entry is particularly strong for independent and more moderate candidates, which may increase polarization.We provide a model of politician career incentives to interpret the results.

  • The Undoing of Economic Sanctions: Evidence from the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

    SSRN Electronic Journal · 2025-01-01 · 1 citations

    preprintOpen access1st authorCorresponding
  • The Undoing of Economic Sanctions: Evidence from the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

    SSRN Electronic Journal · 2025-01-01 · 1 citations

    preprintOpen access1st authorCorresponding
  • Revolving Door Laws and Political Selection

    SSRN Electronic Journal · 2025-01-01 · 1 citations

    articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding
  • The Undoing of Economic Sanctions: Evidence from the Russia-Ukraine conflict

    SSRN Electronic Journal · 2024-01-01 · 3 citations

    articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding
  • Physician Altruism and Spending, Hospital Admissions, and Emergency Department Visits

    JAMA Health Forum · 2024-10-11 · 1 citations

    articleOpen access

    Importance: Altruism-putting the patient first-is a fundamental component of physician professionalism. Evidence is lacking about the relationship between physician altruism, care quality, and spending. Objective: To determine whether there is a relationship between physician altruism, measures of quality, and spending, hypothesizing that altruistic physicians have better results. Design, Setting, and Participants: This cross-sectional study that used a validated economic experiment to measure altruism was carried out between October 2018 and November 2019 using a nationwide sample of US primary care physicians and cardiologists. Altruism data were linked to 2019 Medicare claims and multivariable regressions were used to examine the relationship between altruism and quality and spending measures. Overall, 250 physicians in 43 medical practices that varied in size, location, and ownership, and 7626 Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries attributed to the physicians were included. The analysis was conducted from April 2022 to August 2024. Exposure: Physicians completed a widely used modified dictator-game style web-based experiment; based on their responses, they were categorized as more or less altruistic. Main Measures: Potentially preventable hospital admissions, potentially preventable emergency department visits, and Medicare spending. Results: In all, 1599 beneficiaries (21%) were attributed to the 45 physicians (18%) categorized as altruistic and 6027 patients were attributed to the 205 physicians not categorized as altruistic. Adjusting for patient, physician, and practice characteristics, patients of altruistic physicians had a lower likelihood of any potentially preventable admission (odds ratio [OR], 0.60; 95% CI, 0.38-0.97; P = .03) and any potentially preventable emergency department visit (OR, 0.64; CI, 0.43-0.94; P = .02). Adjusted spending was 9.26% lower (95% CI, -16.24% to -2.27%; P = .01). Conclusions and Relevance: This cross-sectional study found that Medicare patients treated by altruistic physicians had fewer potentially preventable hospitalizations and emergency department visits and lower spending. Policymakers and leaders of hospitals, medical practices, and medical schools may want to consider creating incentives, organizational structures, and cultures that may increase, or at least do not decrease, physician altruism. Further research should seek to identify these and other modifiable factors, such as physician selection and training, that may shape physician altruism. Research could also analyze the relationship between altruism and quality and spending in additional medical practices, specialties, and countries, and use additional measures of quality and of patient experience.

  • Corruption as a Shared Dilemma: Survey Evidence from Legislators and Citizens in Three Countries

    SSRN Electronic Journal · 2024-01-01

    articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding

Recent grants

Frequent coauthors

  • Yongxiang Wang

    93 shared
  • Daniel W. Elfenbein

    Washington University in St. Louis

    93 shared
  • Brian McManus

    92 shared
  • Silvia Vannutelli

    60 shared
  • Paolo Pinotti

    57 shared
  • Francesco Decarolis

    57 shared
  • Pierre Azoulay

    49 shared
  • Kareen Rozen

    John Brown University

    49 shared

Education

  • Ph.D.

    Harvard University

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