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Russell Weinstein

Russell Weinstein

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University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign · Department of Labor and Employment Relations

Active 1990–2026

h-index9
Citations249
Papers4415 last 5y
Funding
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About

Professor Russell Weinstein is an Associate Professor at the School of Labor and Employment Relations. His research focuses on information and migration frictions in the labor market and their effect on employer recruiting strategies, human capital investments, and firm/worker match quality. He holds a PhD in Economics from Boston University, earned in 2014, an MA in Political Economy from Boston University in 2012, and an AB in Economics (magna cum laude) from Harvard University in 2007. Professor Weinstein teaches courses such as 'The Gender Wage Gap' and is actively involved in research related to labor economics, urban economics, economics of education, and econometrics.

Research topics

  • Sociology
  • Political Science
  • Economics
  • Demographic economics
  • Labour economics
  • Business
  • Economic growth
  • Gender studies
  • Engineering

Selected publications

  • Version 1

    Open MIND · 2026-01-01

    otherSenior author

    <div>This folder contains the raw PSID data for replicating the results in "The Boss is Watching: How Monitoring Decisions Hurt Black Workers", which will be published in the <i>Economic Journal</i>. All of the code and documentation for replicating the results will be in the replication package published in the <i>Economic Journal'</i>s community of Zenodo (<a target="_blank" rel="nofollow" href="https://ejdataeditor.github.io/replicate.htm">https://ejdataeditor.github.io/replicate.htm</a>). The PSID data in this folder need to be downloaded and put in the main replication package for the paper that can be downloaded from the <i>Economic Journal'</i>s community of Zenodo (<a target="_blank" rel="nofollow" href="https://ejdataeditor.github.io/replicate.htm">https://ejdataeditor.github.io/replicate.htm</a>). The PSID file in this depository should be put in the replication package folder \Replication package\Raw datasets\.<br></div><div><br></div><br><br><br>

  • Archival Version

    Open MIND · 2026-01-01

    otherSenior author

    <div>This folder contains the raw PSID data for replicating the results in "The Boss is Watching: How Monitoring Decisions Hurt Black Workers", which will be published in the <i>Economic Journal</i>. All of the code and documentation for replicating the results will be in the replication package published in the <i>Economic Journal'</i>s community of Zenodo (<a target="_blank" rel="nofollow" href="https://ejdataeditor.github.io/replicate.htm">https://ejdataeditor.github.io/replicate.htm</a>). The PSID data in this folder need to be downloaded and put in the main replication package for the paper that can be downloaded from the <i>Economic Journal'</i>s community of Zenodo (<a target="_blank" rel="nofollow" href="https://ejdataeditor.github.io/replicate.htm">https://ejdataeditor.github.io/replicate.htm</a>). The PSID file in this depository should be put in the replication package folder \Replication package\Raw datasets\.<br></div><div><br></div><br><br><br>

  • Recruiting Intensity, Hires and Vacancies: Evidence from Firm-Level Data

    The Economic Journal · 2025-01-09

    articleOpen accessSenior author

    Abstract We investigate employer recruiting behaviour, using detailed firm-level data from a national survey of employers hiring recent college graduates. We find that this behaviour is responsive to the business cycle, beliefs about labour market tightness and the intended number of hires. Specifically, employers adjust planned recruiting effort and compensation. We then show that, when firms expend greater recruiting effort, they ultimately hire more individuals per vacancy. These results suggest that, when firms want to increase hires, they adjust both the quantity of vacancies and the recruiting intensity per vacancy. If this is true more broadly in the labour market, it may help explain the breakdown in the standard matching function during the Great Recession.

  • The Great Recession and the Widening Income Gap between Alumni of Elite and Less Selective Universities

    American Economic Journal Economic Policy · 2025-01-31 · 7 citations

    article1st authorCorresponding

    Using mobility report card data, I show the income gap between alumni of elite and less selective universities widened for cohorts graduating during the Great Recession. This is evident for mean and median incomes and access to high earning percentiles. Results do not appear driven by differences in student composition, including parental income. Using a unique dataset of recruiting strategies for prestigious firms, I highlight one channel through which university selectivity may have a causal impact: high-wage firms concentrated their recruiting at elite universities during the recession. The results are informative for policies increasing lower-income students’ representation at selective universities. (JEL D31, E32, I23, I28, J31)

  • Replication Package for: "The Boss is Watching: How Monitoring Decisions Hurt Black Workers"

    Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) · 2023-09-14

    datasetOpen accessSenior author

    Cavounidis, Costas, Kevin Lang, and Russell Weinstein (2023): "The Boss is Watching: How Monitoring Decisions Hurt Black Workers"

  • The Boss is Watching: How Monitoring Decisions Hurt Black Workers

    The Economic Journal · 2023 · 10 citations

    Senior authorCorresponding
    • Political Science
    • Sociology
    • Demographic economics

    Abstract African Americans face shorter employment durations than similar Whites. We hypothesise that employers discriminate in acquiring or acting on ability-relevant information. In our model, monitoring Black, but not White, workers is self-sustaining. New Black hires were more likely fired by previous employers after monitoring. This reduces firms’ beliefs about ability, incentivising discriminatory monitoring. We confirm our predictions that layoffs are initially higher for Black than non-Black workers, but that they converge with seniority and decline more with the Armed Forces Qualification Test for Black workers. Two additional predictions, lower lifetime incomes and longer unemployment durations for Black workers, have known empirical support.

  • Replication Package for: "The Boss is Watching: How Monitoring Decisions Hurt Black Workers"

    Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) · 2023-09-14

    datasetOpen accessSenior author

    Cavounidis, Costas, Kevin Lang, and Russell Weinstein (2023): "The Boss is Watching: How Monitoring Decisions Hurt Black Workers"

  • "Workhorses of Opportunity": Regional Universities Increase Local Social Mobility

    SSRN Electronic Journal · 2022-01-01 · 9 citations

    articleOpen accessSenior author
  • Preference Signaling and Worker-Firm Matching: Evidence from Interview Auctions

    RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · 2021-08-07

    articleOpen accessSenior author

    We study whether there are improvements in worker-firm matching when employers and applicants can credibly signal their interest in a match. Using a detailed résumé dataset of more than 400 applicants from one university over five years, we analyze a matching process in which firms fill some of their inter- view slots by invitation and the remainder are filled by an auction. Consistent with the predictions of a signaling model, we find the auction is valuable for less desirable firms trying to hire high desirability applicants. Second, we find evidence that is consistent with the auction benefiting overlooked applicants. Candidates who are less likely to be invited for an interview (e.g., non-U.S. citizens) are hired after having the opportunity to interview through the auction. Among hires, these candidates are more represented among auction winners than invited interviewees, and this difference is more pronounced at more desirable firms. Finally, counterfactual analysis shows the auction increases the number and quality of hires for less desirable firms, and total hires in the market.

  • Graduating from a Less Selective University During a Recession: Evidence from Mobility Report Cards and Employer Recruiting

    SSRN Electronic Journal · 2021-01-01

    articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding

Frequent coauthors

Education

  • Ph.D., Human Resources

    University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

    2000
  • M.S., Human Resources

    University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

    1996
  • B.S., Human Resources

    University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

    1994
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