About

Shelly Kagan is the Clark Professor of Philosophy at Yale University. His main research interests lie in moral philosophy, with a particular focus on normative ethics. Much of his scholarly work centers on the debate between consequentialist and deontological moral theories. He has published on topics including the nature of well-being, moral desert, utopia, and the connections between Kantianism and consequentialism. Kagan is also a popular lecturer at Yale, especially known for his introductory lectures on Death and Ethics. His course on Death has been developed into an Open Yale Course, which has gained notable popularity in China and Korea. Additionally, his book titled "Death," based on this course, has been a national bestseller in South Korea.

Research topics

• Psychology
• Philosophy
• Epistemology
• Environmental ethics
• Social psychology

Selected publications

• What’s Wrong with Speciesism?

  2026-05-08

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding

  Abstract Peter Singer famously argued in Animal Liberation that almost all of us are speciesists, unjustifiably favoring the interests of humans over the similar interests of other animals. Although the author long found that charge compelling, this essay expresses growing doubts. It starts by trying to get clear about the nature of speciesism, and then argues that Singer’s attempt to show that speciesism is a mere prejudice is unsuccessful. Nonetheless, most of us are not actually speciesists at all, but rather accept a view called modal personism. Although the defense of modal personism in this essay is tentative, it is, at the very least, a philosophical view worthy of further consideration.

  PublisherDOI

• Editorial Commentary & Further Reading

  2026-05-08

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding

  Abstract The purpose of this editorial commentary on volume I of Shelly Kagan’s collected papers (The Structure of Normative Ethics & Other Essays in Moral Philosophy) is threefold. First, interrelations between the arguments, concepts, and distinctions in the volume are pointed out. Second, references to various works by Kagan that are not included, in particular his books, are provided. Third, there are references to various responses to Kagan’s work.

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• The Structure of Normative Ethics & Other Essays in Moral Philosophy

  Research portal (Tilburg University) · 2026-06-10

  article1st authorCorresponding

  This volume contains a selection of essays on the structure and methods of normative ethics by Shelly Kagan. <br/><br/>The essays are grouped in three parts. Part I contains a cluster of essays on the structure of normative ethics. These essays provide a systematic survey of the basic normative factors, introduce the concept of evaluative focal points, and examine competing theories about the foundations of normative ethics. The essays in Part II explore the various methods of normative ethics, critically examining the role of thought experiments and the practical difficulty of following moral principles given various epistemic limitations. Part III brings together two essays relating to practical ethics, in particular on whether consequentialist theories can adequately deal with collective action problems, and on whether speciesism is morally wrong. The volume also contains a preface by Kagan, an introduction co-written by the two editors, and a commentary by the two editors that identifies interrelations between Kagan’s published works and points to criticisms and developments of his work by other philosophers. <br/><br/>This volume is the first in a two-volume collection of Kagan’s essays. Its successor, Rethinking Intrinsic Value &amp; Other Essays on the Good, collects essays on value, well-being, and desert.

  Publisher

• Is Norcross Right about Right?

  Utilitas · 2025-02-13

  articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding

  Abstract In Morality by Degrees , Alastair Norcross defends a view he calls “scalar consequentialism.” I argue, first, that Norcross does not use the term consistently, since in most passages this seems to refer to a version of consequentialism that rejects all claims about rightness altogether, yet in other passages Norcross claims that scalar consequentialists should nonetheless embrace his favored “contextualist” account of rightness. I also argue, second, that the particular arguments offered by Norcross as to why consequentialists should forgo more traditional consequentialist accounts of rightness (such as maximizing or satisficing) are unpersuasive.

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• Disagreement

  2023-08-30

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  Abstract One common argument for moral skepticism appeals to the prevalence of moral disagreement. It holds that the best explanation for the widespread disagreement about moral facts is that there simply are no such facts, so there is nothing to constrain our beliefs. This chapter explores this skeptical argument and notes mechanisms capable of leading to moral disagreement that would nonetheless be compatible with accepting moral realism. The chapter also questions whether the principle underlying the argument from disagreement can be reasonably maintained, given the many other philosophical subjects which also display disagreement, including metaethics itself. The chapter concludes by asking whether a variant of the argument—one which turns on whether moral disagreement is in principle eliminable—does any better.

  PublisherDOI

• Moral Realism

  2023-08-30

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  Abstract Moral realists hold that there are moral facts and that some moral claims are objectively true. This view is supported by intuition, which defeasibly justifies our belief in a wide variety of such facts. To be sure, this justification could be defeated, if there were compelling reason to be skeptical about the very existence of morality, but the survey of skeptical arguments undertaken in this book shows them to be less powerful than one might initially think. This still leaves the task of combining the various intuitions into a systematic moral theory. That’s the job of normative ethics, but there is no compelling reason to hold that it cannot be successfully completed. So moral realism remains an intellectually respectable position, and indeed it is arguably a more plausible position to embrace than moral skepticism.

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• Motivation

  2023-08-30

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  Abstract According to motive internalism, moral beliefs are capable of motivating those who accept them. Yet according to the Humean theory of motivation, motivation itself is only possible when the agent has a relevant desire. Noncognitivists argue that this shows that so-called moral beliefs are not genuine beliefs at all, but rather are desires. Accordingly, moral realists have to either reject motive internalism, reject the Humean theory of motivation, or reject the implicit assumption that no belief can be a desire as well. The prospects for each alternative are considered.

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• What Would Morality Need to Be?

  2023-08-30

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  Abstract Moral skeptics deny the existence of objective morality, and all thoughtful individuals at least sometimes wonder if there really can be such a thing. But what would it take for there to be something worthy of the name “morality”? What would it take for moral facts to be objective? This chapter introduces a variety of different features that one might want to build into the “job description” for morality. This is important to do because people disagree about what morality would need to be like. Since skeptical arguments focus on particular features of morality—claiming either that nothing can really have the given feature in question or that it is more plausible to conclude that nothing actually does have the given feature—both skeptics and moral realists need a view about what morality would need to be.

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• Nihilism

  2023-08-30

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  Abstract Nihilists hold that although moral sentences do indeed make claims about purported moral facts, there are no such facts, so all such claims are false. (This should not be confused with the quite different view that all acts are morally permissible.) This chapter lays out the basic nihilist position, and distinguishes between abolitionist versions of nihilism, which hold that we should abandon moral talk, and revisionist versions, which suggest retaining moral language but changing what we use such language to do. The chapter also considers whether the burden of proof falls on nihilists or on moral realists, who posit facts of a sort denied by nihilists.

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• Explanation

  2023-08-30

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  Abstract Genuine facts explain things. But it is far from clear that moral facts, if there were such things, would explain anything at all, so that may provide a reason to deny the reality of moral facts. This chapter explores this challenge, and asks, first, whether moral facts might indeed play a role in explaining various empirical facts. Reductionist accounts of moral properties seem to point to a promising way to meet the explanatory requirement, but such accounts raise complicated questions about reductionism and explanation and whether the normative aspect of moral facts plays a genuine role in the relevant explanations. Alternatively, perhaps the challenge can be met if by abandoning the assumption that the explanatory requirement can only be satisfied if it is an empirical fact that is being explained.

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Frequent coauthors

• Ян Шапиро

  Apple (United States)

  3 shared

• Catherine Hayes

  3 shared

• Th Eory Of Literature

  2 shared

• Steven Smith

  University of Illinois Chicago

  2 shared

• Dale Martin

  2 shared

• Paul Fry

  2 shared

• Jack F. Douglas

  National Institute of Standards and Technology

  2 shared

• Gilbert Harman

  2 shared