About

Yevgeniy Dodis is a Professor at the Department of Computer Science at the Courant Institute of Mathematical Sciences, New York University, and an IACR Fellow. His main research interests are in Cryptography, with particular focus on Leakage-Resilient Cryptography, Random Number Generation, Cryptography with Biometrics and Other Noisy Data, Hash Functions and the Random Oracle Model, Information-Theoretic Cryptography, and Secure (Group) Messaging. He is also interested in broader areas of Theoretical Computer Science, including Algorithms, Complexity, and Combinatorics. Professor Dodis has made significant contributions to cryptology, especially in the areas of cryptographic randomness and symmetric-key primitives. His work has been recognized with awards such as the IACR Test of Time Award in 2019 and 2021, and he was named an IACR Fellow in 2020 for his fundamental contributions. He has been actively involved in the cryptography community through organizing seminars, conferences, and serving as an editor for the Journal of Cryptology. His academic career includes advising numerous PhD students and postdoctoral researchers, and he has participated in many prominent conferences and workshops, often in leadership roles such as program co-chair and general chair.

Research topics

• Computer Security
• Computer Science
• World Wide Web
• Computer network

Selected publications

• Perpetual Encryption

  Lecture notes in computer science · 2026-01-01

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding
  PublisherDOI

• Fair Multiparty Coin Tossing from Minimal Assumptions

  Lecture notes in computer science · 2026-01-01

  book-chapter
  PublisherDOI

• Generic Anonymity Wrapper for Messaging Protocols

  2025-11-19

  articleOpen accessSenior author

  Modern messengers use advanced end-to-end encryption protocols to protect message content even if user secrets are ever temporarily exposed. Yet, encryption alone does not prevent user tracking, as protocols often attach metadata, such as sequence numbers, public keys, or even plain user identifiers. This metadata reveals the social network as well as communication patterns between users. Existing protocols that hide metadata in Signal (i.e., Sealed Sender), for MLS-like constructions (Hashimoto et al., CCS 2022), or in mesh networks (Bienstock et al., CCS 2023) are relatively inefficient or specially tailored for only particular settings. Moreover, all existing practical solutions reveal crucial metadata upon exposures of user secrets.

  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• HELP: Everlasting Privacy through Server-Aided Randomness

  IACR Communications in Cryptology · 2025-01-13

  articleOpen access1st authorCorresponding

  Everlasting (EL) privacy offers an attractive solution to the Store-Now-Decrypt-Later (SNDL) problem, where future increases in the attacker's capability could break systems which are believed to be secure today. Instead of requiring full information-theoretic security, everlasting privacy allows computationally-secure transmissions of ephemeral secrets, which are only "effective" for a limited periods of time, after which their compromise is provably useless for the SNDL attacker. In this work we revisit such everlasting privacy model of Dodis and Yeo (ITC'21), which we call Hypervisor EverLasting Privacy (HELP). HELP is a novel architecture for generating shared randomness using a network of semi-trusted servers (or "hypervisors"), trading the need to store/distribute large shared secrets with the assumptions that it is hard to: (a) simultaneously compromise too many publicly accessible ad-hoc servers; and (b) break a computationally-secure encryption scheme very quickly. While Dodis and Yeo presented good HELP solutions in the asymptotic sense, their solutions were concretely expensive and used heavy tools (like large finite fields or gigantic Toeplitz matrices). We abstract and generalize the HELP architecture to allow for more efficient instantiations, and construct several concretely efficient HELP solutions. Our solutions use elementary cryptographic operations, such as hashing and message authentication. We also prove a very strong composition theorem showing that our EL architecture can use any message transmission method which is computationally-secure in the Universal Composability (UC) framework. This is the first positive composition result for everlasting privacy, which was otherwise known to suffer from many "non-composition" results (Müller-Quade and Unruh; J of Cryptology'10).

  PublisherOA PDFDOI

• Triple Ratchet: A Bandwidth Efficient Hybrid-Secure Signal Protocol

  Lecture notes in computer science · 2025-01-01 · 6 citations

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding
  PublisherDOI

• Guarding the Signal: Secure Messaging with Reverse Firewalls

  Lecture notes in computer science · 2025-01-01 · 1 citations

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding
  PublisherDOI

• Ideal Pseudorandom Codes

  2025-06-15 · 2 citations

  article
  PublisherDOI

• Signcryption

  2025-01-01

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding
  PublisherDOI

• Random Oracle Combiners: Merkle-Damgård Style

  Lecture notes in computer science · 2025-01-01

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding
  PublisherDOI

• Anamorphic-Resistant Encryption; Or Why the Encryption Debate is Still Alive

  Lecture notes in computer science · 2025-01-01 · 5 citations

  book-chapter1st authorCorresponding
  PublisherDOI

Recent grants

• TC: Small: The Design of Secure Hash Functions and Block Ciphers

  NSF · $500k · 2010–2014

• TWC: Medium: Collaborative: The Theory and Practice of Key Derivation

  NSF · $669k · 2013–2019

• CAREER: Exposure-Resilient Cryptography

  NSF · $330k · 2002–2008

• CT-ISG: On Imperfect Randomness and Exposure-Resilient Cryptography

  NSF · $300k · 2008–2012

• TWC: Small: On Imperfect Randomness and Leakage-Resilient Cryptography

  NSF · $500k · 2013–2017

Frequent coauthors

• Daniel Wichs

  39 shared

• Moti Yung

  Columbia University

  25 shared

• Harish Karthikeyan

  JPMorgan Chase & Co (United States)

  23 shared

• David M. Cash

  University College London

  20 shared

• Daniel Gallancy

  University of Electro-Communications

  19 shared

• Erik Aronesty

  University of Atacama

  19 shared

• Oren Tysor

  National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology

  19 shared

• Christopher Higley

  National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology

  19 shared

Labs

• Cryptography Group, Department of Computer Science, Courant Institute of Mathematical Sciences, New York UniversityPI

Education

• Ph.D., Computer Science

  New York University

• M.S., Computer Science

  New York University

• B.S., Computer Science

  New York University

Awards & honors

• 2021 IACR Test of Time Award for our work on verifiable rand…
• 2020 IACR Fellow
• 2019 IACR Test of Time Award for our work on fuzzy extractor…
• Facebook award on "Secure the Internet" for my work on Encry…