Emir Kamenica
· Richard O. Ryan Professor of EconomicsVerifiedUniversity of Chicago · Microeconomics
Active 2004–2026
About
Emir Kamenica is the Richard O. Ryan Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. His research encompasses an eclectic set of topics in microeconomics, with a particular focus on theoretical work in information design. Professor Kamenica has been recognized for his contributions to the field, notably receiving the Alfred P. Sloan Research Fellowship in 2013. He also holds an honorary doctorate from Shepherd University. From 2016 to 2024, he served as an Editor of the Journal of Political Economy. Born in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Professor Kamenica earned both his PhD in Economics in 2006 and his bachelor's degree in applied mathematics in 2001 from Harvard University. He joined the faculty at Chicago Booth in 2006, where he continues his academic and research endeavors.
Research topics
- Political Science
- Sociology
- Information Retrieval
- Computer Science
- Social psychology
- Demography
- Psychology
- Economics
- Mathematics
- Law
- Demographic economics
- Theoretical computer science
- Anthropology
- Gender studies
Selected publications
Data and Code for: “What is newsworthy? Theory and evidence"
ICPSR Data Holdings · 2026-03-27
datasetOpen accessWe introduce a model in which a benevolent news outlet decides whether to report the realization of a state to a consumer, who pays a cost to receive it. A simple statistical rule, called a proper scoring rule, describes when the outlet should be more likely to report the realization. Using data from the US television news, we show that a particular scoring rule successfully predicts many salient features of news reporting. We show how to use this rule as a control variable to discipline tests of reporting bias, and we show that controlling for it matters in our applications.
Data and Code for: “What is newsworthy? Theory and evidence"
ICPSR Data Holdings · 2026-03-27
datasetOpen accessWe introduce a model in which a benevolent news outlet decides whether to report the realization of a state to a consumer, who pays a cost to receive it. A simple statistical rule, called a proper scoring rule, describes when the outlet should be more likely to report the realization. Using data from the US television news, we show that a particular scoring rule successfully predicts many salient features of news reporting. We show how to use this rule as a control variable to discipline tests of reporting bias, and we show that controlling for it matters in our applications.
Reducing Congestion Through Information Design
World Scientific series in economic theory · 2025-05-01
book-chapterWorld Scientific series in economic theory · 2025-05-01
book-chapter1st authorCorrespondingWorld Scientific series in economic theory · 2025-05-01
book-chapterSenior authorBayesian Persuasion and Information Design
World Scientific series in economic theory · 2025-05-01
book-chapter1st authorCorrespondingWorld Scientific series in economic theory · 2025-05-01
paratextSenior authorA Rothschild–Stiglitz Approach to Bayesian Persuasion
World Scientific series in economic theory · 2025-05-01
book-chapterSenior authorBayesian Persuasion with Multiple Senders and Rich Signal Spaces
World Scientific series in economic theory · 2025-05-01
book-chapterSenior authorWorld Scientific series in economic theory · 2025-05-01 · 76 citations
book-chapterSenior authorWe study symmetric information games where a number of senders choose what information to communicate. We show that the impact of competition on information revelation is ambiguous in general. We identify a condition on the information environment (i.e., the set of signals available to each sender) that is necessary and sufficient for equilibrium outcomes to be no less informative than the collusive outcome, regardless of preferences. The same condition also provides an easy way to characterize the equilibrium set and governs whether introducing additional senders or decreasing the alignment of senders’ preferences necessarily increases the amount of information revealed.
Frequent coauthors
Education
- 2006
Ph.D.
Harvard University
- 2001
B.S., applied mathematics
Harvard University
Awards & honors
- 2013 Alfred P. Sloan Research Fellowship
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